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INTRODUCTION
[Senator Reid] was wowed by Obama's oratorical gifts and
believed that the country was ready to embrace a black
presidential candidate, especially one such as Obama-a "light-
skinned" African American "with no Negro dialect, unless he
wanted to have one," as he later put it privately
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The above statement, which journalists Mark Halperin and John
Heilemann attribute to Senator Harry Reid,2 offers anecdotal proof that
Americans make consequential distinctions among same-race individuals.
Legal scholars have been studying this phenomenon, known as intra-group
preferencing, for years.' Indeed, in 2000, I contributed to the scholarly
literature by publishing an article that directly examines one of the issues
raised by Reid's observation. Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Colo,-
analyzes the ways in which people, of all races, make distinctions within
racial categories on the basis of skin color.
This issue arises often in the employment setting. For example, an
employer may prefer one African-American employee over another
because of the employees' respective skin tones (assume that one
employee is milk chocolate brown and the other is dark chocolate brown).'
CLINTONS, MCCAIN AND PALIN, AND THE RACE OF A LIFETIME 36 (2010).
2. Id.
3. Senator Reid was not the only public official in recent years to allude to the
significance of skin color in electoral politics. In January 2007, when commenting on
Obama's candidacy for the presidency, then-Senator Joseph Biden stated, "I mean, you got
the first mainstream African-American who is articulate and bright and clean and a nice-
looking guy. . . I mean, that's a storybook, man." Jason Horowitz, Biden Unbound: Lays
Into Clinton, Obama, Edwards, N.Y. OBSERVER, Feb. 4, 2007, available at
http://www.observer.com/2007/politics/biden-unbound-lays-clinton-obama-edwards#. To
be sure, "bright" may reference intelligence and "clean" may reference a certain freshness
of appearance. One, however, cannot help but wonder if Biden's perceptions were also
influenced by Obama's lighter skin tone. Indeed, it was arguably his intra-group
preferencing (of African-American candidates like Barack Obama, as opposed perhaps to
previous African-American candidates like Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton) that rendered
Biden's comments so inflammatory and controversial at the time. See Angela Onwuachi-
Willig, Volunteer Discrimination, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1895, 1913 (2007) (discussing the
significance of racial performances to mainstream acceptability); Catherine Smith, Queer
As Black Folk?, 2007 Wis. L. REV. 379, 398 (2007) (discussing the implicit racial criticism in
supposed "compliments" like that rendered by Biden); Terry Smith, Speaking Against
Norms: Public Discourse and the Economy of Racialization in the Workplace, 67 AM. U. L.
REV. 523, 525 (2008) (noting that Biden's comments exposed the ways in which previous
Black candidates may have been deemed unacceptable).
4. See infra notes 8 and 9.
5. 49 DUKE L.J. 1487 (2000). See also Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker
Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1705 (2000); Leonard M. Baynes, If It's Not Just Black
and White Anymore, Why Does Darkness Cast a Longer Discriminatory Shadow Than
Lightness? An Investigation and Analysis of the Color Hierarchy, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 131
(1997).
6. See, e.g., Brack v. Shoney's, Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 938 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (darker-
toned African-American employee alleged that supervisor preferred lighter-toned African
Americans). Importantly, color preferences are highly contextual and do not always
operate in favor of lighter skin tones. See, e.g., Walker v. Internal Revenue Serv., 713 F.
Supp. 403 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (plaintiff alleged that her supervisor preferred darker-skinned
African Americans). For more detailed discussion of this issue, see Jones, Shades ofBrown,
supra note 5, at 1515-21. For the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC)
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My purpose in Shades ofBrown was to demonstrate the sophisticated and
nuanced nature of modern discrimination and to argue for legal
recognition of skin color discrimination, which is also referred to as
colorism.' In recent years, the literature on colorism has grown, with
scholars across disciplines tackling this phenomenon from both domestic
and international perspectives.
Over the past decade, scholars have also paid increasing attention to
intra-group discrimination that occurs as a result of certain, usually
nonconformist, identity performances.' For example, an employer may
definition of color discrimination, see Facts About Race/Color Discrimination, EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/fs-race.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2010).
The EEOC is one of the primary governmental agencies charged with enforcing federal
antidiscrimination laws.
7. See also Trina Jones, The Case for Legal Recognition of Coloism Claims, in
SHADES OF DIFFERENCE: WHY SKIN COLOR MATTERS 233 (Evelyn Nakano Glenn ed.,
2009).
8. See generally PETER FROST, FAIR WOMEN, DARK MEN: THE FORGOTTEN ROOT
(2005); SHADES OF DIFFERENCE, supra note 7 (collecting cross-disciplinary essays
examining relevance of skin tone domestically and internationally); MARGARET L.
HUNTER, RACE, GENDER, AND THE POLITICS OF SKIN TONE (2005) (providing a historical
account and contemporary analysis of colorism in both African-American and Mexican
communities); RACISM IN THE 21ST CENTURY: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF SKIN COLOR
(Ronald E. Hall ed., 2008) (collecting works and arguing that, as racial categorization has
become more difficult in the twenty-first century, skin color as a mechanism for
distinguishing individuals has become increasingly important); JOANNE L. RONDILLA &
PAUL SPICKARD, Is LIGHTER BETTER? SKIN-TONE DISCRIMINATION AMONG ASIAN
AMERICANS (2007) (exploring colorism in Asian-American cultures); SKIN DEEP: How
RACE AND COMPLEXION MATTER IN THE "COLOR-BLIND" ERA (Cedric Herring, Verna
Keith & Hayward Derrick Horton eds., 2004) (collecting articles on both inter- and intra-
group colorism); Rodolfo Espino & Michael F. Franz, Latino Phenotypic Discrimination
Revisited: The Impact of Skin Color on Occupational Status, 83 Soc. SCI. Q. 612 (2002)
(finding that darker Mexicans and Cubans received lower occupational prestige scores than
their lighter-toned counterparts); Arthur Goldsmith, Darrick Hamilton & William Darity,
Jr., Shades of Discrimination: Skin Tone and Wages, 96 AMER. ECON. REV. 242 (2006)
(finding that "among Black males there was a substantial wage advantage (on the order of
7%) for having light skin); Christina Gomez, The Continual Signfficance of Color: An
Exploratory Study of Latinos in the Northeast, 22 HisP. J. BEHAV. SCI. 94 (2000) (studying
the effects of colorism on Latinos in the Northeast and finding that darker skin negatively
affects wages for men but such effects were not demonstrated for women); Aaron
Gullickson, The Significance of Color Declines: A Re-Analysis of Skin Tone Differentials
in Post-Ci Rights America, 84 SoC. FORCES 157 (2005) (arguing that disparities resulting
from skin tone differences are on the decline among persons born in the 1940s and later in
education, employment, and occupational attainment; no such decline found for spousal
attainment); Joni Hersch, Profiling the New Immigrant Worker: The Effects of Skin Color
and Height, 26 J. LAB. ECON. 345 (Apr. 2008) (finding that recent immigrant workers who
are taller and with lighter skin tones earn higher wages than those who are not); Cynthia E.
Nance, Colorable Claims: The Conthuing Significance of Color Under Title VII Forty
Years After Its Passage, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 435 (2005) (arguing that personal
and economic effects of colorism remain a contemporary issue among all racial groups).
9. See generally KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL
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distinguish between women who wear makeup and women who do not,"o
or a woman of color who wears dreadlocks or braids and one who perms
(or chemically straightens) her hair." Like the literature on colorism,
identity performance scholarship underscores that modern discrimination
is not only about the wholesale exclusion of particular groups (e.g., all
Latinos or allwomen), but also about intra-group distinctions.12
Educating the public and policymakers about the complex and
constantly changing nature of discrimination is no doubt critically
important, and scholars in recent years have done an excellent job both
explaining intra-group preferencing and making persuasive arguments for
legal recognition of intra-group claims." One question, however, has
received scant attention in the literature. It is this: assuming a legal basis
for intra-group claims, can plaintiffs actually win these cases?14 In other
RIGHTS (2006); John 0. Calmore, Whiteness as Audition and Blackness as Performance:
Status Protest from the Margin, 18 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 99 (2005); Devon W. Carbado &
Mitu Gulati, The Fth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701 (2001); Devon W.
Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000); Barbara J.
Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking,
104 YALE L.J. 2009 (1995); Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity:
Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134 (2004); Emily
M.S. Houh, Toward Praxis, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 905 (2005); Angela Onwuachi-Willig,
supra note 3. See also the excellent collection of essays in Symposium Issue: Makeup,
Identity Performance & Discrimination, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & PoL'Y (2007).
10. See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2006)
(upholding company policy requiring female employees to wear makeup). For additional
analysis, see the collected essays in Symposium Issue: Makeup, Identity Performance &
Discrimination, supra note 9.
11. See, e.g., Eatman v. United Parcel Serv., 194 F. Supp. 2d 256, 259-60, 269
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (upholding company policy prohibiting "unconventional" hairstyles);
Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (upholding
American Airlines' policy of prohibiting braided hairstyles in certain job classifications).
For an insightful critique of Rogers, see Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives
on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365 (1991).
12. See Devon Carbado, Mitu Gulati & Gowri Ramachandran, The Story of
Jespersen v. Harrah's: Makeup and Women at Work, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
STORIES 117 (Joel Friedman ed., 2006) (asserting that "sex discrimination today is not
usually going to take the form of total exclusion. Companies will employ a number of
gendered technologies to screen in some women and screen out others.").
13. See supra notes 5, 8-9.
14. Failure to analyze this question is due in part to the fact that scholars have been
busy attempting to explain what intra-group preferencing is and how very serious a
problem it is. In addition, the number of intra-group lawsuits has been relatively small,
making it difficult to assess impediments to proof in a wide range of cases. This is changing
as colorism filings with the EEOC have increased, from 374 in fiscal year 1992 to 1241 in
fiscal year 2006. Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, EEOC
Takes New Approach to Fighting Racism and Colorism in the 21st Century Workplace
(Feb. 28, 2007), available at http://www.ee.oc.gov/press/2-28-07.html [hereinafter EEOC,
New Approach]. The majority of EEOC charges in 2002 were in the Northeast (44%),
followed by the West (21%), South (15%), Midwest (12.5 %), and Southwest (7.5%). Press
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words, it is one thing to be able to assert a right to relief. It is another to
convince a fact-finder to grant that relief.
To be sure, it is difficult as a general matter for plaintiffs to win
discrimination cases." As several scholars have observed, this difficulty
may stem in part from judicial bias against these claims. 16 Contrary to
available evidence, some judges appear to believe that discrimination
claims are "generally unmeritorious, brought by whining plaintiffs who
have been given too many, not too few, breaks along the way."" The
Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, EEOC Settles Color Harassment
Lawsuit with Applebee's Neighborhood Bar and Grill (Aug. 7, 2003), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/press/8-07-03.html [hereinafter EEOC Settles Color Harassment
Lawsuit].
15. A voluminous literature exists that both documents plaintiffs' low success rates
and explores possible reasons for these outcomes. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart
J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare rn Federal Court, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429 (2004) (finding that employment discrimination cases settle
less often than other types of cases and that plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases
are less likely to win than other plaintiffs); Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Unwrapping
Racial Harassment Law, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 49, 54, 98-99 (2006) (detailing
results of empirical study showing that plaintiffs in racial harassment cases are more likely
than plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases to fare poorly); Kevin M. Clermont, Theodore
Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the
Federal Courts ofAppeals, 7 EMPL. RTs. & EMPLOY. POL'Y J. 547, 566 (2003) (showing that
employment discrimination plaintiffs fare poorly on appeal, with a 7% reversal rate when
defendants win at trial compared to a 42% reversal rate when plaintiffs win at trial);
Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 889 (2006) (showing that plaintiffs have most difficulty winning in race and national
origin discrimination cases); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases
So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 560-61 (2001) (showing that plaintiffs in employment
cases win only 18.7% of the time in bench trials, compared with success rates of 43.5% and
41.8% for insurance and personal injury cases, respectively); Memorandum from Joe Cecil
& George Cort, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to Hon. Michael Baylson, Estimates of Summary
Judgment Activity in Fiscal Year 2006 (June 15, 2007) (showing that, in 2006, the national
average for summary judgment grants resulting in termination of cases was 70% in civil
rights cases and 73% in employment discrimination cases-the highest for federal civil
cases). Compare Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for
Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 100 (1999) (finding that defendants prevail in
more than 93% of reported ADA employment cases decided on the merits at the trial court
level and in 84% of cases that are appealed and available on Westlaw).
16. Clermont, Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 15, at 567 (arguing that "[tihe anti-
plaintiff effect on appeal raises the specter that appellate courts have a double standard for
employment discrimination cases, harshly scrutinizing employees' victories below while
gazing benignly at employers' victories"); Parker, supra note 15, at 931-41 (discussing the
extensive empirical research in support of the existence of a "judicial bias" against plaintiffs
in antidiscrimination cases and examining its impact on claims of racial discrimination);
Selmi, supra note 15, at 556 (noting "general misperception" among federal judges that
"the volume of employment discrimination cases ... reflect[s] an excessive amount of costly
nuisance suits").
17. Selmi, supra note 15, at 556. See also Parker, supra note 15, at 931-41 (explaining
why race neutral factors are inadequate to explain judicial decision-making and noting anti-
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hurdles are particularly high in race discrimination cases, where some
judges analyze the claims from "an anti-affirmative action mindset, one
that views both the persistence of discrimination and the merits of the
underlying claims with deep skepticism." 8
Although the bar is already high for plaintiffs in discrimination cases,
there are additional challenges that arise in the context of intra-group
claims. Indeed, when one examines the principal colorism and identity
performance cases, plaintiffs overwhelmingly tend to lose." This Article
plaintiff bias in race cases). Two neutral justifications for plaintiff losses are frequently
offered: (1) all the good cases settle, leaving only the weakest for judicial decision; and (2)
defendants have better lawyers given their resources. The data, however, do not support
these explanations. As Wendy Parker points out, if the strongest cases settle, then "one
could expect high settlement rates for cases in which the plaintiff won on a summary
judgment motion, which signals some merit to the plaintiff's claim. But the empirical
studies . . . indicate that cases in which plaintiffs won a summary judgment motion had a
lower settlement rate. . . ." Id. at 894. In addition, given the rarity of plaintiff victories at
trial, it is doubtful that defendants have a strong incentive to settle. Id. at 922. As for the
second explanation, while plaintiffs' lawyers may be less highly resourced than defendants',
this theory is not sufficiently satisfactory. As Pat Chew and Robert Kelley point out:
[A]n alternative theory could predict that plaintiffs and their lawyers, given their
limited resources, are particularly careful to determine the quality of their cases
and only proceed with what they believe are high quality cases.. .. It is unlikely
... that plaintiffs and their lawyers would consistently be four times more likely
to misjudge the quality of their cases over a ten year period. A more plausible
explanation is that some systematic factor is at play, such as judges as a group
being biased in favor of defendants (or biased against plaintiffs). When faced
with the defendant's motion for summary judgment, for instance, the judge must
decide which party's position is the most convincing. As products of their
socialization, judges may be consciously and deliberately, or as likely,
unconsciously and unintentionally biased.
Chew & Kelley, supra note 15, at 99.
18. Selmi, supra note 15, at 562. Selmi further notes that "courts appear hesitant to
draw inferences of racial discrimination based on circumstantial evidence, even though
courts have long recognized that race discrimination is generally more subtle in form and
dependent upon circumstantial evidence." Id. at 563. See also Parker, supra note 15, at
931-41 (noting that "although all discrimination cases are hard to win, that difficulty is
especially pronounced for race and national origin claims").
19. Other than four claims handled by the EEOC and one case litigated under the
Fair Housing Act (FHA), I have yet to find cases where a plaintiff who brought an intra-
group discrimination claim won after a trial on the merits. For a description of colorism
cases pursued by the EEOC, see Significant EEOC Race/Color Cases, U.S. EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/initiatives/erace/
caselist.cfm (last visited Nov. 2, 2010). For the FHA case, see Rodriguez v. Gattuso, 795 F.
Supp. 860, 866 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (finding for plaintiffs in case involving housing
discrimination against darker-toned Latinos in favor of lighter-toned Latinos).
For colorism cases resolved in favor of the defendant, usually on a motion to dismiss or
by summary judgment, see Lindsay v. Pizza Hut of Am., 57 F. App'x. 648 (6th Cir. 2003);
Brack v. Shoney's, Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 938 (W.D. Tenn. 2003); Sidique v. Univ. of
Pittsburg, No. 02-365, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20473 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2003); Karim v.
Staples, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 737 (D. Md. 2002); Hill v. Textron Auto. Interiors, Inc., 160 F.
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identifies and examines four challenges these plaintiffs face.2 o Importantly,
the goal here is not to make a case for legal recognition of intra-group
claims as that work has been undertaken elsewhere. 2' Instead, by pointing
to some of the more common, and more serious, difficulties plaintiffs
encounter when litigating intra-group cases, this Article aims to make such
claims not only theoretically plausible but also winnable.
The analysis proceeds as follows. Part II provides a more detailed
analysis of colorism and identity performance claims, summarizing their
similarities and differences and their relationship to other intra-group
claims. Part III examines the broader legal landscape within which these
claims are asserted and summarizes the judicial response to them. Part IV
explores obstacles to relief encountered by plaintiffs in intra-group
discrimination cases. Importantly, these obstacles may help to explain why
some lawyers are reluctant to accept colorism and identity performance
cases and why, when they do, lawyers frequently attempt to fit these claims
Supp. 2d 179 (D.N.H. 2001); Rios v. Aramark Corp., 139 F. Supp. 2d 210 (D.P.R. 2001);
Ofudu v. Barr Lab., Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Hines v. F.J.C. Sec. Co., No.
96 Civ. 2632 (JFK), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1537 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1998); Santiago v.
Stryker Corp., 10 F. Supp. 2d 93 (D.P.R. 1998); Franceschi v. Hyatt Corp., 782 F. Supp. 712
(D.P.R. 1992); Walker v. Internal Revenue Serv., 742 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (finding
for defendant on the merits after bench trial); Felix v. Marquez, 1981 WL 275 (D.D.C. Mar.
26, 1981); Ali v. Nat'l Bank of Pak., 508 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See also Bryant v.
Bell Atlantic Maryland, Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 132-33 (4th Cir. Apr. 29, 2002) (acknowledging
that color discrimination is a claim under Title VII, but barring plaintiff's claim for color
discrimination because plaintiff did not raise it in EEOC charge); Moore v. Dolgencorp,
Inc., No. 1:05-CV-107, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66973, at *8-*12 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 19, 2006)
(same); Sere v. Board of Tr., 628 F. Supp. 1543, 1546 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding color claims
not cognizable under Section 1981); Waller v. Int'l Harvester Co., 578 F. Supp. 309, 314
(N.D. Ill. 1984) (same).
In several cases, the plaintiffs survived motions to dismiss or motions for summary
judgment. It is, however, unclear whether they eventually won their cases. See, e.g., Salas
v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corr., No. 05-C-399-C, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21140 (W.D. Wis. Apr.
17, 2006) (surviving motion to dismiss); Arrocha v. City Univ. of N.Y., No. CV-02-1868
(SJF)(LB), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4486 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2004) (same); Singletary v.
District of Columbia, 351 F.3d 519 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (same); Munshi v. Alliant Techsystems,
Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9639 (June 26, 2001) (same); Roy v. Austin Co., 1996 WL
599435 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 1996) (same); Abdulrahim v. Glick Co., 612 F. Supp. 256 (N.D.
Ind. 1985) (dismissing claims under Title VII, but allowing claims under Section 1981 to
proceed). Importantly, studies suggest that prevailing on a motion to dismiss or a motion
for summary judgment does not increase the rate of settlement or plaintiffs' ultimate
success rates when appearing before a judge. Parker, supra note 15, at 920.
Finally, it is worth noting that there are numerous cases where it is difficult to discern
from the written opinion whether the allegations were of race or color discrimination. I
have chosen to omit these cases for purposes of this analysis.
20. For more specific analysis of jurisprudential problems faced by Latino/as in
colorism cases, see Tanya Kateri Herndmdez, Latinos at Work: When Color Discrimination
Involves More Than Color, in SHADES OF DIFFERENCE, supra note 7, at 236-44.
21. See, e.g., Banks, supra note 5; Jones, Shades ofBrown, supra note 5.
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into more traditional and more familiar analytical frameworks (e.g., by
presenting them as race or national origin claims).2 2 Part V offers an
alternative approach to intra-group claims that may ameliorate some of
these difficulties. In short, I argue that instead of focusing inordinately on
whether the plaintiff and defendant are of the same class and on whether
the plaintiff was treated differently from someone in her class, in assessing
liability courts should try to uncover the employer's conception of the ideal
employee and the extent to which the plaintiff deviates from this ideal.'
II.
A CLOSER LOOK AT SKIN COLOR AND IDENTITY PERFORMANCE
DISCRIMINATION
In 1986, Tracy Walker, a light-skinned African-American typist for the
IRS alleged that her supervisor, a dark-skinned African American, fired
Walker because of Walker's lighter skin tone.24 In March 2001, Dwight
Burch, an African-American server at an Applebee's restaurant, brought
suit against his employer, alleging that he was verbally harassed, and
ultimately fired, because of his darker skin tone.25  Burch claimed that,
22. There may be a compelling strategic reason for lawyers and antidiscrimination
advocates to characterize colorism claims as simply race claims. Before proceeding in court
with a race discrimination claim under Title VII, aggrieved persons must file a charge with
the EEOC. Importantly, the scope of any subsequent legal claim is limited by the factual
information included on the EEOC charge form. Because lay persons often do not
distinguish between color and race, they tend to describe color claims as race claims on
their EEOC charge forms. This makes prosecuting the suit as a colorism claim difficult.
Indeed, some courts have dismissed colorism claims on this ground. See, e.g., Bryant, 288
F.3d at 132-33 (dismissing color claim because of failure to include theory in EEOC
charge); Moore, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66973, at *8-*12 (same); Sullivan, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8402, at *5-*7 (same). Not all courts have taken this approach. For example, in
Ofudu v. Barr Labs, Inc., the court declined to dismiss the plaintiffs claims after the
plaintiff failed to include color in the EEOC charge, observing "[f]rankly, to the uninitiated
(which most charging parties are), the difference between race discrimination and color
discrimination is imperceptible." 98 F. Supp 2d at 515. The court nonetheless granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment due to the plaintiff's absence of evidentiary
proof. Id. at 517. See also Arrocha, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4486, at *18 n.2 ("Since a claim
for discrimination based on color is 'reasonably related' to plaintiffs race discrimination
claim, his failure to check the 'color' box in his EEOC complaint does not bar such a claim
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.").
23. Before proceeding, two caveats are in order. First, the analysis herein focuses
primarily on employment discrimination cases because that is the area in which one sees
most colorism and identity performances cases. This focus, however, should not obscure
the fact that identity performance discrimination and colorism occur in other contexts.
Second, I have primarily focused on intra-racial screening for ease of analysis. Again, it
bears remembering that intra-group preferencing occurs frequently within other
classifications (e.g., gender, national origin, etc.).
24. Walker v. Internal Revenue Serv., 713 F. Supp. 403, 404 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
25. SeeEEOC Settles Color Harassment Lawsuit, supra note 14.
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during his three months of employment at Applebee's, the manager
repeatedly referred to him as a "tar baby," "black monkey," "jig-a-boo,"
and "blackie," and advised Burch to "bleach his skin." 26
Both the Walker and Burch cases were brought as color, not race,
claims.27 The problem in each case was not necessarily that the plaintiffs
were African American; Walker and Burch's employers did not appear to
be generally opposed to employing African Americans. 28  The problem
was that Walker and Burch were the wrong shades of brown (i.e., too light
and too dark, respectively). Thus, instead of excluding all African
Americans, the employers were engaging in intra-group screening or
preferencing on the basis of skin color. Walker and Burch presumably
would not have been subject to discriminatory treatment if their skin tones
had been different.
I have argued elsewhere that it is important to isolate the
distinguishing variable in intra-group cases in order to expose this more
nuanced form of discrimination. 29 For example, if one were to focus only
on broad categories like race, then colorism would be obscured due to an
assumption that a Black3 0 employer will not discriminate against Black
employees or that any employer, regardless of race, who hires people of
color will not distinguish among them. In addition to isolating the
distinguishing variable, it is also important to understand why color may
lead to differential treatment. As I have demonstrated elsewhere, skin
color implicates a number of concerns. At times, it may serve as an
indicator of socio-economic class.31 The meaning attributed to skin color
26. Dana Hedgpeth, Settlement Reached in Color-Bias Suit; Black Worker at
Applebee's Said Lighter-Skinned Black Supervisor Harassed 1IM, WASH. POsT, Aug. 8,
2003, at E4; Marjorie Valbrun, EEOC Sees Rise in Intrarace Complaints of Color Bias,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2003, at B1.
27. Walker, 713 F. Supp. at 403,405, 407; Hedgpeth, supra note 26.
28. Walker's discrimination came, after all, at the hands of another African American.
To be sure, some employers may prefer to have no African Americans in the workplace.
However, because all-White workplaces are normatively suspicious, these employers may
concede to employ African Americans whom they find more palatable or acceptable. Thus,
intra-group screening and preferencing should not be read to signal an absence of racism.
29. Jones, Shades ofBrown, supra note 5, at 1541-44.
30. I use the words "Black" and "African American" deliberately in this article. I use
Black in a global sense to reference Black people regardless of their national origin. Thus,
the word Black would encompass Black citizens of the United States, Ghana, Mexico,
Cuba, etc. I use African American to reference Black persons who are citizens of the
United States and whose ethnic and cultural identity is historically based in this country.
Thus, African American is a subset of the larger category Black. I capitalize "Black" and
"White" when these words are used to reference races because these references often
function as proper names for their respective groups.
31. Id. at 1528 (noting that historically, lighter-skinned Blacks have enjoyed a higher
socio-economic status than darker-skinned blacks). See also Espino & Franz, supra note 8,
at 612 (finding that darker Mexicans and Cubans received lower occupational prestige
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may draw upon the symbolism associated with the colors white and black
and concepts of good and evil related thereto.32 Skin color may be used to
indicate race, 33 and in intra-group comparisons it may produce a more
subtle form of racism.34 Lawyers litigating colorism claims must be aware
scores than their lighter-skinned counterparts); Goldsmith, Hamilton & Darity, supra note
8, at 245 (finding a 7% wage advantage for black males with light skin).
32. Jones, Shades of Brown, supra note 5, at 1528 (describing ways in which
"'whiteness' or 'fairness' is associated with purity and innocence, and 'blackness' is
associated with dirt, evil, and death"). Frantz Fanon captures this symbolism effectively in
BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS, when he notes:
In Europe, the black man is the symbol of Evil. One must move softly, I know,
but it is not easy. The torturer is the black man, Satan is black, one talks of
shadows, when one is dirty one is black-whether one is thinking of physical
dirtiness or of moral dirtiness. It would be astonishing, if the trouble were taken
to bring them all together, to see the vast number of expressions that make the
black man the equivalent of sin. . . . Blackness, darkness, shadow, shades, night,
the labyrinths of the earth, abysmal depth, blacken someone's reputation; and, on
the other side, the bright look of innocence, the white dove of peace, magical,
heavenly light. A magnificent blond child-how much peace there is in that
phrase, how much joy, and above all how much hope! There is no comparison
with a magnificent black child: literally, such a thing is unwonted.
FRANTz FANON, BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS: THE EXPERIENCES OF A BLACK MAN IN A
WHITE WORLD 188-89 (1967). For additional insight on the symbolism of the colors black
and white, and how this symbolism becomes culturally entrenched see Thomas Ross, The
Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White Innocence and Black Abstraction, 32 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1, 34-39 (1990); Harold R. Isaacs, Blackness and Whiteness, 21 ENCOUNTER 12
(1963).
33. Importantly, in the United States, colorism was promoted by the racist ideology
created to justify slavery and the imperial conquest of indigenous peoples. But there is
reason to believe that color has significance outside of this racialized context. As Professor
Angela Harris notes:
Although many United States writers treat Atlantic chattel slavery as the original
point of colorism, colorism is in fact global, and it is not clear that it is always and
everywhere purely an ideological or material product of the African slave trade.
There is ample evidence, for example, that light skins are also preferred to dark
ones in East and South Asia, regions where African slavery had little or no
presence and where the valuation of light skin predates the slave trade. And in
some regions, "whiteness" as an aesthetic ideal is not represented by a European
body, but a Japanese or Chinese one.
Angela P. Harris, From Color Line to Color Chart?: Racism and Colorism in the New
Century, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 52, 55-56 (2008).
34. By this I mean that the racism evident in intra-group cases is to some extent
different from the racially exclusionary practices of the past. While colorism is often
informed by the same racist ideologies and stereotypes that fueled past discriminatory acts,
exposing racism in intra-group claims is more complex because not all Blacks are harmed
by it. In addition, the traditional methods courts have used to smoke out racism do not
necessarily work in colorism cases. Comparing the treatment of Blacks and Whites as
general groups (as has been the baseline method in race discrimination cases) will not
necessarily pick up discrimination on the basis of color. For more discussion of this point,
see Jones, Shades of Brown, supra note 5, at 1529-30 (explaining that colorism may draw
upon racism and nineteenth-century ideologies of race); Harris, supra note 33, at 54-58
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of the long and complex history surrounding skin color in order to educate
sometimes uninformed decision makers about the various meanings
ascribed to it. That is to say, lawyers must be prepared to explain that
color is a loaded marker, signifying social and economic desirability, and
that discrimination based on skin color is not simply a reflection of
aesthetic preferences the way in which distinctions based on eye color or
hair color may be.
Like colorism, identity performance claims also frequently result from
intra-group preferencing. A typical example might involve two African-
American female associates at a law firm: Lakesha Johnson and Shymeka
Smith. Lakesha Johnson, who prefers to be called L.K. Johnson, has
permed hair, wears understated jewelry and dresses conservatively A la
Jackie 0. She socializes with her coworkers, avoids committee work
involving racial or gender issues, and never interacts with the firm's
primarily African-American and Latino/a secretarial and cleaning staff.
L.K. lives in a predominantly White suburban neighborhood and is very
careful to always use standard, crisply enunciated, English. In contrast,
Shymeka Smith has long, flowing dreadlocks and wears African-inspired
attire and bold, colorful jewelry. Shymeka tends not to socialize with her
coworkers, has been vocal and actively involved in the firm's diversity
committee, lives in the inner city, is openly friendly with the office
secretaries and cleaning staff, and laughs loudly."
L.K. is promoted to partner and Shymeka is denied promotion.
Assuming roughly the same talent level (i.e., they each have the same
technical skills required to do the job), one could argue that Shymeka was
passed over because she chose to embrace her racial identity rather than to
(summarizing differing views about relationship between colorism and racism).
35. This hypothetical was inspired by the work of Devon W. Carbado and Mitu
Gulati. See Carbado & Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, supra note 9. Real world
examples, however, are plentiful. For example, one need only consider the differing
outcomes for women who choose to wear makeup and those who refuse to be made up.
See Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1106, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006)
(rejecting claim of bartender who was discharged for refusing to wear makeup). See also
Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (rejecting claim of
woman who wanted to wear a braided hairstyle). One might also consider the difference
between Michael Jordan, the clean-shaven, pristine former NBA megastar known for
playing by the rules and never challenging "the system," and Allen Iverson, the rebel who
embraced hip-hop culture and who has been an outspoken critic of racism in the NBA. On
a different playing field, one could compare the public reception of Marvin Harrison, the
quiet and steady former receiver for the Indianapolis Colts, with the reception given the
more brash and outspoken Terrell Owens of the Cincinnati Bengals. Or, one might
compare the public's reaction to Barack Obama with the reaction to Al Sharpton or Jesse
Jackson. This is not to suggest that Barack Obama, Michael Jordan, or Marvin Harrison
have circumvented the issue of racism. Rather, I am suggesting that racial performances
matter in the way in which these individuals are perceived. See supra notes 3 and 9 and
accompanying text.
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downplay or distance herself from that identity. That is, Shymeka was
harmed because her identity performance did not conform to mainstream
norms. According to Professor Kenji Yoshino, Shymeka failed to "cover;"
that is, she failed to "mute[] the difference between [herlself and the
mainstream.",3 6 Instead of reflecting racial differences, what Shymeka
should have done was to minimize those differences by adopting a racial
performance closer to L.K.'s.
The problem in identity performance cases, as in colorism cases, is not
racial discrimination the way in which it has historically been understood
(i.e., as the wholesale exclusion or denigration of all persons within a
particular racial category). Rather, the problem is intra-group screening: a
more subtle, sophisticated, and at times subconsciously motivated form of
discrimination which is revealed by unveiling the ways in which different
racial performances challenge existing norms and consequently provoke
different responses.
Importantly, there has been forward progress with some intra-group
claims in recent decades. Due in part to the influential work of scholars
like Angela Harris37 and Kimberl6 Crenshaw," courts are increasingly
willing to recognize what are known as intersectionality claims.39
Intersectionality theory posits that individuals may be subject to adverse
treatment as a result of the convergence, or intersection, of two or more
protected classifications. Thus, an Asian woman may allege that she was
discriminated against not because she is a woman, or Asian, but because
36. Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility
Presumption and the Case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," 108 YALE L.J. 485, 500 (1998).
Yoshino distinguishes between passing and covering. The former involves hiding one's
identity or keeping a trait invisible. The latter involves downplaying that identity or
keeping a trait unobtrusive. Id. at 500-01. He notes: "Passing is at issue, for example, when
gays are permitted to serve in the military as long as they do not disclose their orientation. .
. . Covering is at issue . .. when an employer retains 'out' gays, but not a lesbian who
'flaunts' her homosexuality by entering into a public commitment ceremony with her same-
sex lover." Id. at 500.
37. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN.
L. REv. 581 (1990).
38. See KimberI6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctnne, Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989).
39. See Lam v. University of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551, 1561-62 (9th Cir. 1994)
(recognizing intersection between race and gender in a Title VII discrimination claim);
Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032-34 (5th Cir. 1980)
(same); Graham v. Bendix Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1036, 1047 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (same). But see
Degraffenreid v. Gen. Motors Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142, 145 (E.D. Mo. 1976) (early
intersectionality case in which court declined to create a new class of "protected minorities
[black women], governed only by mathematical principles of permutation and
combination").
668
HeinOnline  -- 34 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 668 2010
INTRA-GROUPPREFERENCING
she is an Asian woman.' This is a form of intra-group preferencing
because employers may be willing to hire Asians or women, but not a
subgroup within either of those two categories-namely Asian women.4 1
For example, in Lam v. University of Hawaii, an Asian woman sued the
University of Hawaii alleging that it discriminated against her when it
rejected, without serious consideration, her application for the directorship
of a program at the University's law school.42 The district court granted
summary judgment to the defendant on the grounds that the University
had favorably considered the application of an Asian man (supposedly
negating racial bias) and had ultimately offered the position to a White
woman (supposedly negating gender bias).43 The Ninth Circuit reversed,
noting:
As other courts have recognized, where two bases for
discrimination exist, they cannot be neatly reduced to distinct
components. Rather than aiding the decisional process, the
attempt to bisect a person's identity at the intersection of race and
gender often distorts or ignores the particular nature of their
experiences. . . . Like other subclasses under Title VII, Asian
women are subject to a set of stereotypes and assumptions shared
neither by Asian men nor by white women. In consequence, they
may be targeted for discrimination "even in the absence of
40. See Lam, 40 F.3d at 1554. See also Virginia W. Wei, Asian Women and
Employment Discrimination: Using Intersectionality Theory to Address Title VII Claims
Based on Combined Factors of Race, Gender and National Origin, 37 B.C. L. REV. 771
(1996).
41. It is important to keep in mind that Asian women are subject to stereotypes that
may not apply to Asians in general. For example, Asian Americans are often stereotyped
as "hardworking, industrious, thrifty, and family oriented." See Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien
and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, "Foreignness," and Racial Hierarchy in American Law,
76 OR. L. REV. 261, 296 (1997) (noting that positive attributes associated with "the model
minority" can easily turn into elements of the "yellow peril" when "hardworking and
industrious becomes unfairly competitive; family-oriented becomes clannish; mysterious
becomes dangerously inscrutable"). Asian women, however, are additionally stereotyped
as, among other things: passive, repressed, naive lotus blossoms; sexually exotic or
seductively mysterious geisha; or devious and wicked dragon ladies. See Wei, supra note 40,
at 801-04 (examining stereotypes of Asian women); Peter Kwan, Invention, Inversion and
Intervention: The Oriental Woman in the World of Suzie Wong, M Butterfly, and the
Adventures of Priscilla, Queen of the Desert, 5 ASIAN L.J. 99, 100 (1998) (examining
construction of the "Oriental Woman" in films, noting that she is "meek, shy, passive,
childlike, innocent, and naive" and that this "fictive creation" is "an invention of the
western imagination deployed to justify sexual exploitation, dominance and not
infrequently, violence to Asian women"); Sumi K. Cho, Converging Stereotypes in
Racialized Sexual Harassment: Where the Model Minority Meets Suzie Wong, 1 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 177, 182-95 (1997) (analyzing stereotypes of Asian Pacific American
women).
42. 40 F.3d at 1554.
43. Id. at 1561.
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discrimination against [Asian] men or white women."
Accordingly... when a plaintiff is claiming race and sex bias, it is
necessary to determine whether the employer discriminates on the
basis of that combination of factors, not just whether it
discriminates against people of the same race or of the same sex."
Though logically similar, intersectionality claims differ from colorism
and identity performance cases. With intersectionality claims, the basis for
distinction is usually a defined and established marker like race, gender, or
national origin.45 As I demonstrate in Part IV(C), difficulties arise when
the markers are less clear and less well established as is often the case in
colorism and identity performance cases. In addition, in intersectionality
cases, the markers are usually based upon a fundamental right or an
immutable characteristic.46 Again, as I demonstrate in Part IV(C), when
these attributes are missing, problems of proof arise.
III.
JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO COLORISM AND IDENTITY PERFORMANCE
CLAIMS
Although there was initial uncertainty over whether courts would
recognize colorism as a legal claim,47 that uncertainty appears to have
disappeared. Over the past twenty-three years, no court has held that
colorism claims lack a legal basis," and the number of claims has
skyrocketed.4 9 Colorism claims, however, have been incredibly difficult to
44. Id. at 1561-62 (citations omitted).
45. Courts have also recognized discrimination against a subgroup within a class in
what are known as sex-plus cases. Generally, these cases involve discrimination against
women on the basis of gender and an additional characteristic related to gender. See, e.g.,
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (sex and reproductive capacity);
Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994) (gender and pregnancy);
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969) (sex and having pre-school age
children); Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 629 F. Supp. 925, 944 (D. Neb. 1986) (sex and
pregnancy).
46. The former is absent in colorism cases. Both variables are generally lacking in
identity performance cases.
47 In two early cases, courts refused to recognize color discrimination claims as
cognizable under Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See Sere v. Bd. of Trs. of the
Univ. of Ill., 628 F. Supp. 1543 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Waller v. Int'l Harvester Co., 578 F. Supp.
309, 309-10 (N.D. Ill. 1984). Since that time, most courts have recognized colorism as a
legitimate cause of action. See supra note 19.
48. See cases cited supra note 19.
49. Since the mid-1990s, color discrimination filings with the EEOC have increased
significantly, from 374 in fiscal year 1992 to 1,241 in fiscal year 2006. EEOC, New
Approach, supra note 14. Notwithstanding this sharp increase in EEOC filings, colorism
complaints still constitute only about 3% of the 85,000 charges received annually by the
EEOC. Few of these complaints have resulted in court cases. From 1994 to 2002, only
HeinOnline  -- 34 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 670 2010
INTRA -GROUP PREFERENCING
prove."o Indeed, plaintiffs have prevailed in only a handful of cases." This
low success rate could merely reflect that discrimination cases are hard to
win in general.52 But, even with a small sample size, plaintiff success rates
in colorism cases appear to be lower than plaintiff success rates in other
discrimination cases.5 3 The important question is why is there such a sharp
disconnect between theoretical acceptance of colorism as a legal claim and
plaintiff success rates?
Identity performance claims have also received a mixed reception in
the courts. The high point for plaintiffs came in 1989 when the U.S.
Supreme Court decided Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.54 In that case, Ann
Hopkins sued Price Waterhouse alleging that the accounting firm's failure
to promote her to partner resulted from sex discrimination. Hopkins had
an excellent record regarding client relations and was praised for her
technical acumen, her strong intellect, and her rain-making abilities." Her
interpersonal skills, however, were less desirable. Hopkins was criticized
for having an aggressively demanding personality and abrasive interactions
with office staff and was told that, in order to improve her chances for
partnership, she should "walk more femininely, talk more femininely,
dress more femininely, wear makeup, have her hair styled, and wear
jewelry."5 6 She was also advised to consider enrolling in charm school." In
finding that Hopkins had stated a claim of sex discrimination, the U.S.
Supreme Court observed:
[A]n employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman
cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the
basis of gender .... An employer who objects to aggressiveness in
women but whose positions require this trait places women in an
intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they behave
about twenty complaints led to lawsuits. The remaining complaints were settled out of
court. See EEOC Settles Color Harassment Lawsuit, supra note 14. To be sure, it is
difficult to get a firm grip on the number of colorism claims, as laypersons often treat color
and race synonymously, alleging both race and color discrimination. Historically, these
cases were automatically treated as race cases.
50. The landmark colorism case of Walker v. Internal Revenue Service effectively
demonstrates this point. While the case is widely cited to support the legal validity of
colorism claims, the plaintiff ultimately lost. See Walker v. Internal Revenue Serv., 713 F.
Supp. 403, 404 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (allowing colorism claim by light-skinned Black person
against dark-skinned Black person); Walker v. Internal Revenue Serv., 742 F. Supp. 670,
676 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (finding against plaintiff on the merits).
51. See supra note 19.
52. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
53. See supra note 19.
54. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
55. Id. at 233-34.
56. Id. at 234-35.
57. Id. at 235.
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aggressively and out of a job it they do not. Title VII lifts women
out of this bind."
Price Waterhouse is significant to the present analysis for three
reasons. First, the Court extended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964'9 to cover gender stereotyping,' which can of course lead to intra-
group screening as employers may, depending upon context, prefer women
who perform their identity consistently with traditional gender roles (e.g.,
by being accommodating, charming, and wearing makeup).6 1 Second, the
Court placed reduced reliance upon immutability, a quality the Court has
used often to justify protection for certain classifications, including gender.
Although the attributes for which Ann Hopkins was penalized were
arguably mutable, the Court nonetheless recognized sex stereotyping as a
form of sex discrimination.62 While immutability is not an issue in colorism
cases (as color is largely immutable), it is critically important in identity
performance cases where the differences leading to adverse treatment are
often seen as within the individual's control and are frequently dismissed
as matters of personal choice. Finally, Price Waterhouse is significant
because the Court did not mandate use of a cross-group comparative
analytical framework. Rather than ask if Ann Hopkins was treated the
same as a man with similar attributes, the Court instead asked whether
Price Waterhouse required Ann Hopkins to behave or, in other words, to
perform her identity, the way in which the accounting firm thought women
"should" act.63 As Professors Devon Carbado, Mitu Gulati, and Gowri
Ramachandran observe, instead of making cross-gender comparisons (by
forcing Hopkins to show that men were treated differently),' the Court
58. Id. at 250-51.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
60. Gender stereotyping falls into two categories: normative and descriptive.
Normative stereotyping occurs when an employer has an idea of how women ought to act,
or what women should be like, and screens women to ascertain whether they fit this
understanding. See Carbado, Gulati & Ramachandran, supra note 12, at 140-44. Thus, if
an employer thinks women should be feminine, the employer will screen out women whose
gender performances are insufficiently feminine and screen in women who perform
according to the stereotype (e.g., women who speak softly and giggle, and who wear
dresses, high heels, and make up). Id. Descriptive stereotyping occurs when an employer
has a belief as to what women are like, as opposed to what they should be like. Id For
example, an employer may conclude that women are more caring, less aggressive, and more
family-oriented than men, and may screen employees accordingly.
61. 490 U.S. at 250-51.
62 490 U.S. at 250.
63. 490 U.S. at 256. Here, the accounting firm was engaging in normative as opposed
to descriptive gender stereotyping. See supra note 60.
64. Carbado, Gulati & Ramachandran, supra note 12, at 105. To be sure, men
possessing similar characteristics to Ann Hopkins may well have received different
treatment since men are rarely penalized for being ambitious, assertive and aggressive.
Similarly, Price Waterhouse very well may have rejected a man who exhibited the
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asked whether Price Waterhouse was imposing a stereotypically gendered
identity upon Hopkins.6 ' As I explain in Part V, this move away from strict
adherence to a cross-group comparative framework opens the door to a
more fluid understanding of discrimination and a more expansive
examination of what happens to individuals within groups.
In 1998, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,' the Supreme
Court again recognized that employers differentiate among employees of
the same sex on the basis of gender nonconformity. Oncale involved a
single-sex workplace-an oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico-where the
plaintiff was subject to egregious acts of abuse apparently because he did
not fit a gendered, macho ideal of masculinity.' In other words, he was
not perceived as being "tough enough." In holding that Title VII covers
same-sex harassment claims, the Supreme Court recognized that
individuals can and do discriminate against members of their own sex and
that they draw intra-group distinctions.'
Price Waterhouse and Oncale set the stage for a more probing and
realistic examination of intra-group preferencing. These cases, however,
have been limited in application. Although some lower courts have
granted relief when plaintiffs allege harm due to nonconformity with
traditional gender roles, courts have only been willing to go so far. In the
characteristics the firm urged Ann Hopkins to acquire. That is to say, it is doubtful Price
Waterhouse would have desired male employees who walked femininely, talked
femininely, and wore makeup. It is thus likely that the firm did treat men and women
differently. Nonetheless, while "but for" comparisons are helpful in highlighting the fact of
differential treatment, they beg the question of why men and women are treated
differently. Answering this question requires examining whether Price Waterhouse was
demanding, as a prerequisite to success, that women fit into a preconceived gender role
(i.e., were men and women being required to perform their identities in accordance with a
certain conception of femininity and masculinity).
65. 490 U.S. at 250 (noting that "[i]n the specific context of sex stereotyping, an
employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she
must not be, has acted on the basis of gender").
66. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
67. The court declined to describe the facts in detail for the sake of "brevity and
dignity." Id. at 77. For a description of the horrors Oncale allegedly experienced, see Brief
for Petitioner at 5, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., No. 96-568, 1997 WL 458826,
at *3-*7 (1997); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,
96-568, Amici Curiae Bief in Support of Petitioner, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 13-14
(1997).
68. 523 U.S. at 79 ("If our precedents leave any doubt on the question, we hold today
that nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination 'because of . . . sex'
merely because the plaintiff and the defendant (or the person charged with acting on behalf
of the defendant) are of the same sex."). See also Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481
U.S. 604, 609-10 (1987) (holding that an Iraqi professor who is technically Caucasian
qualifies for protection against race-based discrimination perpetrated by other Caucasian
people if that discrimination is based on membership in "an ethnically and
physiognomically distinctive subgrouping of homo sapiens").
6732010]1
HeinOnline  -- 34 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 673 2010
NYU REVIEW OFLAW& SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. 34:657
Price Waterhouse line of cases, plaintiffs win when they have direct
evidence 69 of gender stereotyping and when the very quality for which they
are penalized is essential to successful job performance (thereby placing
the plaintiff in the catch 22 referenced earlier)."o However, plaintiffs
encounter difficulty when direct evidence is absent or when the quality at
issue is viewed as tangential to job performance.' In addition, plaintiffs in
gender stereotyping cases encounter difficulty when their gender
performances are seen as inconsistent with traditional values and norms
(e.g., a woman who refuses to wear makeup or a man who desires another
man).72 When plaintiffs are seen as pushing the envelope too far, backlash
results and their claims are dismissed as trivial or as matters of choice.
Perhaps most damaging for identity performance claims is the fact that
Price Waterhouse did nothing to upset established precedent in what are
referred to as dress and grooming cases. Since the Fifth Circuit's 1975
decision in Willingham v. Macon Telegraph," courts have consistently
allowed employers to require different grooming requirements for men
and women." The Willingham case involved an employer rule that
69. Direct evidence establishes discrimination without reliance upon inference,
presumption, or other evidence. See Jacklyn v. Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods. Sales
Corp., 176 F.3d 921, 926 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[D]irect evidence is that evidence which, if
believed, requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating
factor" in the decision at issue.). In employment discrimination cases, when a plaintiff
provides direct evidence of discriminatory animus, the burden of persuasion shifts to the
defendant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the
same action even had it not been motivated by discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), 2000e(m) (2006).
70. In Pnce Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins was penalized for being assertive and
aggressive, which are stereotypically masculine traits. Presumably, if Hopkins had behaved
in a more submissive or "feminine" fashion, she would have been penalized for being too
weak. Indeed, she likely would not have been a successful accountant in the competitive
world of mega-accounting firms had she not been tough and assertive. It is in these catch
22 type situations that Price Waterhouse seems to have most traction. For an insightful
critique of the Court's catch 22 analysis, see Carbado, Gulati & Ramachandran, supra note
12, at 144-48.
71. See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2006)
(distinguishing Price Waterhouse from a case in which a female employee was terminated
for refusing to wear makeup, and noting that "[t]he record contains nothing to suggest the
grooming standards would objectively inhibit a woman's ability to do the job"); Dillon v.
Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 766, at *29 (6th Cir. 1992), affld, 952 F.2d 403
(6th Cir. 1992) (distinguishing Pnce Waterhouse from case in which man suffered gross
workplace discrimination on the basis of his assumed sexual orientation on the grounds that
in this case, "[the plaintiffs] supposed activities or characteristics simply had no relevance
to the workplace, and did not place him in a 'Catch-22"').
72. See Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112.
73. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975).
74. Although employers can legally impose different grooming requirements on males
and females, the requirements cannot demean one sex more than the other or impose
unequal burdens (though one could query whether separate (or different) can ever be
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prohibited male, but not female, employees from having hair longer than
shoulder length. In rejecting a challenge by a male employee, the court
noted:
A line must be drawn between distinctions grounded on such
fundamental rights as the right to have children or to marry and
those interfering with the manner in which an employer exercises
his judgment as to the way to operate a business. Hair length is
not immutable and in the situation of employer vis-A-vis employee
enjoys no constitutional protection. If the employee objects to the
grooming code, he has the right to reject it by looking elsewhere
for employment, or alternatively he may choose to subordinate his
preference by accepting the code along with the job. ... From all
that appears, equal job opportunities are available to both sexes.
It does not appear that defendant fails to impose grooming
standards for female employees; thus in this respect each sex is
treated equally."
The court went on to uphold rules that require "grooming in accordance
with accepted community standards of dress and appearance."76
The reasoning employed by the Willingham court is troubling in
several respects. First, the fact that an employer sets grooming standards
for both sexes does not automatically render these standards gender
neutral. Indeed, this reasoning is eerily reminiscent of the type of analysis
the Supreme Court rejected in Loving v. Virginia where, in attempting to
uphold its anti-miscegenation statutes, Virginia argued that its laws were
race neutral because they applied to both Blacks and Whites.77 Second,
community standards may very well incorporate and perpetuate the type
of stereotyped thinking that antidiscrimination law seeks to eliminate.
Why are women expected to wear makeup? Why are men subject to the
opposite expectation? And why can't professional men have longer hair or
wear dresses? The Willingham reasoning obstructs in-depth exploration of
the very questions that would expose the gendered nature of community
standards and how they are applied both across and within groups."
equal). See, e.g., Carroll v. Talman Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Chi., 604 F.2d 1028, 1033
(7th Cir. 1979) (striking down policy allowing men to wear "customary business attire" but
requiring women to wear uniforms). For thoughtful critiques of the grooming cases, see
Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards,
Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541 (1994); Karl E. Klare,
Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 1395 (1992);
Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88
CAL. L. REV. 1, 30-34 (2000).
75. Wilingham, 507 F.2d at 1091-92.
76. Id. at 1092.
77. 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967).
78. The court also seems to suggest that some infringements-those that restrict only
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The Oncale precedent has proven similarly unhelpful to plaintiffs who
bring intra-group, performance-based claims of discrimination. Here, it
has not been the subsequent narrowing of the decision but the demanding
standard of proof established by Oncale itself that creates difficulties for
plaintiffs. In the Oncale opinion, the Supreme Court insisted that the
plaintiff demonstrate "but for" causation. In other words, it required the
plaintiff to show that he would not have been subject to discrimination if
he had been of a different sex.79 The Court noted that "but for" causation
was fairly easy to establish in male-female sexual harassment cases because
the allegedly discriminatory activity usually involved explicit or implicit
proposals of sexual activity and "it is reasonable to assume those proposals
would not have been made to someone of the same sex."so The court went
on to find that the same chain of inference would exist in same-sex
harassment cases if (1) "there were credible evidence that the harasser was
homosexual," (2) a female victim was harassed in such sex-specific and
derogatory terms by another woman as to make it clear that the harasser
was motivated by a general hostility to the presence of women in the
workplace, or (3) there was "comparative evidence about how the alleged
harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace.""
The Court's insistence on a cross-group comparison (i.e., a showing
that someone outside of the protected group would have been treated
differently than the plaintiff) limits the utility of Oncale for purposes of
personal "preferences" -are too trivial or too minimal to warrant legal intervention
especially if prohibiting these infringements will further limit employer autonomy. That is
to say, whatever Congress' goal in enacting Title VII, it did not intend for the statute to be
used to mandate that employers adopt unisex dress codes. Yet, the mere fact that behavior
was not within the contemplation of the enacting legislators does not preclude extension of
the statute to comparable evils. See, e.g,. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64
(1986) (extending Title VII to cover claims of sexual harassment). In addition, the
argument that workplace requirements can easily be met begs the question of whether
these requirements are fair.
79. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) ("The critical
issue . . . is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or
conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed." (quoting
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring))).
80. Id. at 80. The heterosexism implicit in the Court's analysis is worth noting.
81. Id. at 80-81. Given this analytical framework (and uncertainty about whether it is
illustrative or exhaustive), it is hard to see how Oncale could have prevailed on remand. In
the case, there was no evidence that the harassers were gay; in an all-male work
environment, it would be impossible to show that the defendants were hostile to the
presence of men; and the workplace was not mixed-sex. The Court's insistence on "but
for" causation raises additional problems. For example, if a woman had worked on the oil
platform and had been subjected to taunts, threats, and violence similar to what Oncale
received, would both she and Oncale have been precluded from bringing claims because of
the fact that the harrassers had targeted members of both sexes? Or, if one of the harassers
had been bisexual and had treated both men and women equally poorly (the equal
opportunity harasser), would there be no claim based on the harasser's acts?
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intra-group claims. In intra-group cases the critical issue is not whether
someone outside the class was treated better, but instead whether the
employer's expectations of individuals falling within the plaintiff's class are
raced or gendered. Thus, cross-group analysis, if done superficially, may
thwart examination of the critical issue in these cases: namely, the
imposition of gendered or racialized stereotypes on nonconformist
members of gender or racial groups.
Much like colorism cases, Oncale and the Pice Waterhouse line of
cases demonstrate how difficult it can be for plaintiffs to succeed with
identity performance claims. This is not to say that colorism and
performance claims are identical. Because skin color is largely immutable,
claims of colorism are less easily characterized as matters of choice This
difference may explain, in part, why courts are more inclined to recognize
a legal basis for colorism claims. The fact, however, that plaintiffs
overwhelmingly lose colorism cases suggests that this difference may lack
meaningful significance. In other words, when one scratches beneath the
surface, plaintiffs in identity performance and colorism cases face many of
the same hurdles. It is to these challenges that I now turn.
IV.
CHALLENGES FOR INTRA-GROUP CLAIMANTS
Plaintiffs raising intra-group discrimination claims push against a bias
in U.S. anti-discrimination law towards thinking of discrimination in Black
and White and cross-racial (as opposed to intra-racial) terms. Due in part
to the history of chattel slavery and to the fact that African Americans
were until recently the largest minority in this country,82 the struggle
against discrimination in the United States has been closely identified with
the African-American struggle against White domination and oppression.
This is buttressed by the fact that it was the African-American struggle for
civil rights83 that produced Brown v. Board of Education,' Loving v.
Virginia," and the landmark anti-discrimination statutes of the 1960s." To
be sure, the United States has always been populated by numerous
82. See Lynette Clemetson, Hispanics Now Largest Minority, Census Shows, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/22/ us/hispanics-now-
largest-minority-census-shows.html.
83. Of course African Americans were not alone in fighting against racial oppression
in this country. People of all races joined in this effort. See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN &
ALFRED A. Moss, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS
536-38 (8th ed. 2004).
84. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
85. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
86. See, e.g., Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968); Voting
Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
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minority groups-all with histories of struggle and resistance that should
not be ignored. However, centuries of pervasive White on Black violence,
abuse, and subordination have left an indelible mark on the way
Americans conceptualize discrimination and utilize legal frameworks
developed to address it.
This can be seen most readily in employment discrimination law where
plaintiffs can seek to prove their cases with either direct or circumstantial
evidence. Direct evidence establishes harmful action motivated by
discriminatory animus without the need for inference. In the absence of
direct evidence, plaintiffs can employ circumstantial proof.' To make a
race claim based upon circumstantial proof, individual plaintiffs need to
show that they applied for a job for which they were qualified and that
notwithstanding their qualifications, they were rejected and the employer
hired someone of a different race." A defendant can rebut this prima facie
case by offering a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her action."
The plaintiff then has an opportunity to show that the defendant's
proffered reason was a pretext and that discriminatory animus more likely
than not led to the action in question.9 0 Plaintiffs can also bring cases
based on systemic proof by showing a statistically significant disparity
between the employer's workforce and the appropriate labor pool9 1 or by
showing that the employer utilized a facially neutral criterion that
produced a disparate impact on a protected class.' In both individual and
systemic cases, the default assumption has been that hiring a White instead
of a Black applicant or the existence of a significant disparity between
Whites and Blacks in the workplace, when unexplained, is the basis for an
inference of discrimination.
87. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
88. Id. at 802 (describing final element of prima facie case as "the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications"). In subsequent cases, the evidence most commonly employed to establish
the final element of the prima facie case was that someone outside of the plaintiff's class
was hired. See, e.g., Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 n.6 (1981);
Walker v. Boys & Girls Club of Am., 38 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1336 (M.D. Ala. 1999).
89. In failure to hire cases, defendants commonly assert that the plaintiff was not the
most qualified person for the position, or in discharge cases, that the plaintiff was not
performing adequately. See, e.g., Brack v. Shoney's Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 938, 943-44 (W.D.
Tenn. 2003) (asserting that plaintiff needed better understanding of operational processes);
Arrocha v. City Univ. of N.Y., No. CV-02-1868, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4486, at *13-*14
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2004) (citing deficiencies in plaintiffs performance as causal factor).
90. The plaintiff always bears the burden of persuasion in establishing discriminatory
animus. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000).
91. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
92. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
93. See, e.g., Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (stating that the prima facie case "raises an
inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained,
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The assumption that an unexplained disparity in the individual or
statistical treatment of certain racial categories was a sufficient basis for an
inference of discrimination was plausible in the 1960s and 1970s. At that
time, Jim Crow segregation was not viewed as a distant practice created
and perpetuated by prior generations. It was an active part of many
American's lived experiences. In addition, racial lines and racial barriers
were sharply defined. People were deemed Black, White, Latino/a, or
Asian and where one stood in the socio-economic hierarchy was largely
determined by one's racial classification. Moreover, the meanings
attributed to Blackness and Whiteness were not veiled by political
correctness, but rather were thrust openly into public discourse and public
spaces.
However, times changed. As the United States progressed beyond an
era defined by images of fire hoses, police dogs, stridently racist public
officials, and de jure segregation, some African Americans slowly began to
gain access to institutions from which they had previously been excluded
and began to occupy different places in the socio-economic hierarchy.9 4
Racial lines and barriers became more permeable and status as a result of
race became less fixed. In addition, the visibility and lived experiences of
other racialized groups increased. As times changed, so too did the nature
of discrimination. What was once blatant became more subtle.
Discussions that were once dominated by a Black-White paradigm were
challenged by peoples of varying shades of brown.95 Gender, class,
are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors" (citing
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978))). See also Teamsters, 431 U.S. at
339 n.20 ("Absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring
practices will in time result in a workforce more or less representative of the racial and
ethnic composition of the population in the community from which employees are hired.").
94. While there has been measurable progress for some African Americans, in most
categories, African Americans still lag behind Whites. See SAMUEL ESTREICHER &
MICHAEL C. HARPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 4-5
(2004) (describing "two black Americas"-one on the path to economic prosperity and one
continuing to face significant barriers to economic opportunity). See generally MELVIN L.
OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE
ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 1-33, 93-97 (10th anniversary ed. 2006) (detailing advances by
African Americans while pointing to substantial racial gaps in wealth and the fragility and
marginality of the Black middle class). In addition, a recent study funded by the Brookings
Institute and the Pew Charitable Trusts found that while income inequality in the United
States has been increasing across the board, the situation is particularly grave for African
Americans, whose children are likely to be less economically mobile than the children of
Whites and are likely to have less family income than their parents. JULIA B. ISAACS,
ISABEL V. SAWHILL & RON HASKINS, THE BROOKINGS INST., GETTING AHEAD OR LOSING
GROUND: ECONOMIC MOBILITY IN AMERICA 5, 27-32, 71-79 (2008), available at
http://economicmobility.org/reports-and-research/mobility-in_america.
95 See generally Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The
"Normal Science" of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213 (1997) (arguing that
the traditional Black/White racial paradigm overlooks historical struggles experienced by
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language, accent, color, and national origin"o' began to complicate the
analysis and served to differentially situate racialized groups and
individuals within those groups. Unfortunately, legal analysis and
doctrinal frameworks failed to keep up with the times. Today, these
frameworks and outmoded ways of thinking about discrimination present
considerable challenges for plaintiffs."
This Part examines four obstacles that plaintiffs face in colorism and
identity performance cases. Although I will examine them separately,
these obstacles frequently work in tandem and are mutually reinforcing,
thus creating more difficulties than their separate treatment might suggest.
As explained in Sections A and B below, the first set of problems relate to
the fact that intra-group claims often do not fit the usual analytical
framework for discrimination cases. Consider, for example, a typical
Black-White race discrimination case. There, the decision maker is
generally White, the person denied the position is of color, and the person
who receives the position is White.'03 If one were to apply this profile to
the Burch case discussed earlier in Part II, the manager would be White,
other people of color).
96. See KimberI6 Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991) (exploring
intersectionality of race and gender in violence against women of color); Harris, supra note
37 (challenging essentialization of unified female voice as neglecting distinct voices of black
women).
97. See, e.g., Trina Jones, Race, Economic Class and Employment Opportunity, 72
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57 (2009); Martha R. Mahoney, Class and Status in American
Law: Race, Interest, and the Anti-Transformation Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 799 (2003);
Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 1847 (1996); john a. powell [sic], The Race and Class Nexus: An Intersectional
Perspective, 25 LAW & INEQ. 355 (2007).
98. See, e.g., Edward M. Chen, LaborLaw & Language Discrimination, 6 ASIAN L. J.
223 (1999); Mark Col6n, Line Drawing, Code Switching, and Spanish as Second-Hand
Smoke: English-Only Workplace Rules and Bilingual Employees, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 227 (2002).
99. See Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a
Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991).
100. See supra notes 5 and 8.
101. See Saito, supra note 41.
102. In a study of employment discrimination cases, Ruth Colker notes that in the
years immediately following passage of Title VII, appellate court interpretations of the
statute were more pro-plaintiff than they are today, suggesting that resistance to
discrimination claims increases as time passes and as decision makers assume that the
nation has moved beyond its racist past. See Colker, supra note 15, at 259-61.
103. See, e.g., Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454 (2006) (White males selected for
promotion over Black males); Cobbins v. Tenn. Dep't of Transp., No. 07-6491, 2009 U.S.
App. LEXIS 8365 (6th Cir. Apr. 2, 2009) (White male selected over Black male); Snooks v.
Duquesne Light Co., No. 08-1689, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 3781 (3rd Cir. Feb. 24, 2009)
(White female promoted over Black male); White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381
(6th Cir. 2008) (White female promoted over Black male).
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Burch would be of color, and Burch would be adversely treated in
comparison to a White employee. Historically, in U.S. anti-discrimination
law, it is the negative treatment of Burch by someone of a different race
(vertical discrimination) and in comparison to someone of a different race
(horizontal discrimination) that creates an inference of racial
discrimination. Inherent in this framework is an assumption that decision
makers prefer individuals of their own race. Complications arise, however,
when this assumption does not hold.
The other set of challenges relates to the nature of intra-group claims.
As I explain in Sections C and D below, unlike traditional markers like
race and gender, intra-group skin tone differences and various types of
identity performances are not viewed by many Americans as bases for
discriminatory conduct. In addition, because there are so many different
skin shades and ways in which people may perform their identity, it may
be hard to determine (indeed to prove) what shades and what
performances fall on the acceptable side of the equation.
A. Vertical Intra-Group Discrimination
As noted above, the typical cross-racial framework does not fit skin
color and identity performance claims because, in many of these cases,
the decision maker and the plaintiff are members of the same group."os For
104. I am not suggesting that all intra-group cases involve a decision maker and a
plaintiff of the same class. Certainly a White employer may differentiate among people of
color on the basis of skin color and racial performances. See Jones, Shades ofBrown, supra
note 5, at 1511-15, for additional analysis of this point. However, many intra-group cases
involve same-race defendants and plaintiffs and when this configuration is present,
additional proof problems arise.
105. Technically, nothing prevents a claim by a plaintiff against a decision maker in
her own class. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78-79
(1998) ("[Wle have rejected any conclusive presumption that an employer will not
discriminate against members of his own race"); Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S.
604, 609 (1987) (rejecting argument that claims of discrimination by one Caucasian against
another are not cognizable under Section 1981); Bryant v. Begin Manage Program, 281 F.
Supp. 2d 561, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that the fact that plaintiffs supervisor was the
same race as plaintiff did not put race claim beyond the scope of Title VII). Historically,
however, courts have been reluctant to allow claims to proceed in these cases. See, e.g.,
Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 1001-02 (5th Cir. 1996) (invoking the fact that
plaintiff, decision makers and replacement employee were all within protected age group to
support conclusion that plaintiff had not successfully made out prima facie case of age
discrimination); Rooks v. Girl Scouts of Chicago, No. 95-3516, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS
20389, at *14 (7th Cir. Aug. 9, 1996) (finding "no compelling inference of age
discrimination" given fact that decision maker was "herself . . . in the protected age
group"); Marlow v. Office of Court Admin., 820 F. Supp. 753, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(requiring plaintiff to show that applicants "outside the protected group were hired in his
stead"), affd, 22 F.3d 1091 (2d Cir. 1993); Walker v. Boys & Girls Club of Am., 38 F. Supp.
2d 1326, 1327 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (noting that while "an organization cannot shield itself from
liability simply by placing members of a protected class in decision making positions[, it] is
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example, in the Burch case, both the manager and Burch were Black.os
Graphically, this can be depicted as follows:
Tynical Case Vartical Intra-Group Cases
Decision maker W B
Plaintiff B (or not White) B
The nontraditional lineup in vertical intra-group discrimination cases
presents three sets of issues, which I shall characterize as skepticism,
indifference, and acceptance.
1. Skepticism
Like White-on-White discrimination, Black-on-Black or vertical intra-
group discrimination is assumed to be so rare, so seemingly against the
norm and illogical, that jurors may deny it or be skeptical about whether it
occurs. Of course there is considerable evidence that members of racial
groups treat one another in sometimes discriminatory and unequal ways;
individuals are not immune to larger socialization processes and frequently
internalize and act upon prejudiced and stereotyped beliefs against
members of their own race.'07 Yet such behavior is usually not perceived
however, extremely difficult for a plaintiff to establish discrimination where the allegedly
discriminatory decision-makers are within the same protected class as the plaintiff");
Dungee v. Northeast Foods, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 682, 688 n.3 (D.N.J. 1996) (finding that the
fact that "the final decision maker and both interviewers are members of the plaintiff's
protected class (women) weakens any possible inference of discrimination"); Hansborough
v. City of Elkhart Parks & Rec. Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 199, 207 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (requiring
"substantial preliminary showing when one black person alleges discrimination by another
black person"). Professors Pat Chew and Robert Kelley offer some support for these
outcomes in their study of racial harassment cases. They found that:
Plaintiffs (who are most likely to be Black) win a slightly higher percentage of cases if
the alleged harassers are White rather than Black. In fact, in the 9 cases in which both
the plaintiffs and the harassers are minority (minority-on-minority harassment), the
plaintiffs lost 8 of the cases. Based on this small sub-sample, there is some indication
that courts find minority-on-minority harassment even less plausible than White-on-
minority harassment. It could be that mostly White judges are not familiar with intra-
minority groups "racial" tensions and harassment. Judges may not be aware of African
Americans harassing each other because of variations of skin color, Hispanics
harassing each other because of differences in immigration status, or Asians harassing
each other because of historical animosities based on countries of origin.
Chew and Kelly, supra note 15, at 105.
106. EEOC Settles Color Harassment Lawsuit, supra note 14.
107. See Jones, Shades of Brown, supra note 5, at 1515-21 (discussing internalized
racism in people of color). See also Lisa V. Blitz & Linda C. Illidge, Not So Black & White:
Shades of Grey and Brown in Antiracist Multicultural Team Building in a Domestic
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as discrimination because of the absence of some sort of cross-group
activity. This absence has led some fact-finders to search for other reasons
or motivations for the decision maker's actions. This was the case in
Hansborough v. City of Elkhart Parks and Recreation, where the court
noted:
Despite the conclusion that as a purely conceptual matter it is
possible for one black person to discriminate against another
black person on the basis of race, the problem of proof remains.
For the plaintiff .. . it is a relatively unique and difficult burden of
proof. One has to be very careful to be sure that what in other
interpersonal relationships might be described as discrimination is
not just plain, ordinary, personal antagonism unrelated to the
color of skin.... This concern causes the court to require a
substantial preliminary showing when one black person alleges
discrimination by another black person.0o
Other courts deciding colorism or identity performance cases have also
invoked alternative explanations (like cronyism, personality clashes,
economic class differences, etc.) in denying plaintiffs their requested
relief.'09
Vertical intra-group discrimination thus only seems to emerge as a
visible phenomenon when it is motivated by an already established
categorical distinction, like gender, race, religion, age, sexuality, or
national origin."o Americans on the whole are far more likely to recognize
the possibility that a Black male supervisor may discriminate against a
Black woman on the basis of gender than they are to recognize the
possibility that a Black male supervisor may discriminate against a Black
woman on the basis of color. I shall return to perceived differences
between color, identity performance, and more traditional markers like
gender and religion-what I call the Murky Marker Problem-in Part
IV(C). For the moment, the key point is that people are generally
skeptical of vertical intra-group discrimination claims because these claims
are less familiar and because the starting and entrenched assumption is
that individuals are less likely to discriminate against persons falling within
their same class."'
Violence Shelter, 6 J. EMOTIONAL ABUSE 113, 118-19 (2006).
108 Hansborough, 802 F. Supp. at 206-07.
109. See infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 105 for cases in which courts found same-race discrimination
actionable, but nonetheless noted that membership of the complainant and decision maker
in the same protected class weakened the inference of discrimination.
111. Of course, history is filled with instances that challenge this assumption. For
centuries, White men have discriminated against White women (e.g., on the basis of
gender). White men have also discriminated against Black men (e.g., on the basis of race).
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2. Indifference
Skepticism poses a significant barrier to relief, but it is not the only
obstacle when both the decision maker and the plaintiff are of the same
class. Sometimes the problem is indifference. This is especially likely
when the plaintiff and the decision maker are both from a disfavored
class-for example, if both are people of color. In these cases, intra-group
claims may be dismissed by White judges and jurors in the way that Black-
on-Black crime sometimes is. Although these fact-finders may recognize
that intra-group discrimination occurs, they may simply not care (or they
may care less) when the decision maker and the plaintiff are Black.
The indifference theory is supported by studies establishing that victim
race and offender race play a significant role in sentencing in criminal
cases.11 2  For example, in capital cases, when the victim is White,
defendants (regardless of their race) are four times more likely to receive a
death sentence than when the victim is Black."' Moreover, Blacks who
kill Whites (B 4 W) have the greatest likelihood of receiving the death
penalty.114 Beyond the capital context, other studies have shown that in
murder and sexual assault cases, when the defendant is Black and the
victim is White (B 4 W), defendants are treated more harshly than when
Women have discriminated against women (e.g., on the basis of race). And people of color
have discriminated against each other (e.g., on the basis of national origin).
Notwithstanding this history, a presumption of in-group camaraderie or intra-group alliance
still exists.
112. One must of course exercise care when discussing the influence of race in
criminal sentencing as researchers have not reached uniform conclusions. As political
scientist and criminologist Cassia Spohn notes:
[T]he relationship between race and sentencing is nonlinear and nonadditive.
The effect of race may be mediated by the race composition of the offender-
victim dyad and by the type of conviction charge; for some types of crimes, it also
may be mediated by the relationship between the offender and the victim.
Researchers who simply test for the direct effect of defendant race may
incorrectly conclude that race does not affect sentence severity. They may miss
the subtle and potentially more interesting interactive effects ....
Cassia Spohn, Crime and the Social Control of Blacks: Offender/Victim Race and the
Sentencing of Violent Offenders, in INEQUALITY, CRIME, & SOCIAL CONTROL 249, 265
(George S. Bridges & Martha A. Myers eds., 1994) (reviewing studies). For additional
discussion of the literature in this area, see id at 249-51.
113. David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski & George Woodworth, Comparative Review of
Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 661, 708-10 (1983).
114. Id. See also Race and the Death Penalty, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
http://www.aclu.org/capital-punishment/race-and-death-penalty (last visited Dec. 10, 2010)
(summarizing studies showing Blacks who kill Whites are much more likely to be sentenced
to death); Race of Death Row Inmates Executed Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/race-death-row-inmates-executed-1976 (last visited Dec.
10, 2010) (showing execution rates in interracial homicide cases); Spohn, supra note 112, at
250-51 (citing studies).
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the defendant and victim are both Black (B 4 B) or when the defendant
and victim are both White (W + W)."' In short, sentences in Black on
White (B -W) criminal cases are harsher than in White on White (W 4
W) or Black on Black (B 4 B) criminal cases.
Scholars have advanced several theories to explain these results. One
theory is that "law exists to maintain the power of the dominant group and
to control the behavior of those who threaten that power." 1 6
Consequently, "crimes involving black offenders and white victims are
punished more harshly because they pose the greatest threat 'to the system
of racially stratified state authority.'"' A second theory posits that
because the lives of Black victims are valued less than the lives of White
victims, "crimes involving black victims are not taken seriously and/or
crimes involving white victims are taken very seriously.""' Consequently,
"crimes against Whites will be punished more severely than crimes against
Blacks regardless of the race of the offender."' 19 A related theory is that
predominantly White jurors are simply unable to identify with Black
victims. 20 According to this theory, "[i]n a society that remains segregated
socially if not legally, and in which the great majority of jurors are White,
115. See Spohn, supra note 112, at 264 (citing studies showing Blacks who sexually
assaulted or murdered Whites faced greater risk of incarceration and longer sentences than
either Blacks or Whites committing those offenses against members of their same race).
These results hold in cases involving serious crimes. When Spohn tested all felony
defendants, she found that
[the] incarceration rate for the black offender/white victim category was nearly
identical to the rate for the black offender/black victim category. And the rate
for the white offender/white victim category was significantly lower than the rate
for the other two categories. These results signal discrimination in sentencing
based on the race of the offender rather than the race of the victim.
Id. at 262.
116. Id. at 252. A similar theory has been offered to explain the higher sentences
imposed on Black men who sexually assault White women. Id. Interestingly, researchers
have found that defendants (regardless of race) in vehicular homicide cases receive
sentences that are 56% longerif the victim was female rather than male and 53% shorterif
the victim was Black rather than White. Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote, The
Determinants of Punishment: Deterrence, Incapacitation and Vengeance 1 (Harvard
Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 1894, April 2000), available at
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/pub/hier/2000/HIER1894.pdf. Glaeser and Sacerdote
suggest that these outcomes may have to do with "vengeance," which may produce outrage
over the death of an innocent woman and lead to disproportionately long sentences. But
when the victim is Black, overt or unconscious racism may produce a significant devaluing
of the victim's life and cause a judge to go lighter on the defendant. See id. at 14-15.
117. Spohn, supra note 112, at 252 (citing Darnell F. Hawkins, Beyond Anomalies:
Rethinking the Conflict Perspective on Race and Criminal Punishment, 65 Soc. FORCES
719 (1987)).
118 Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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jurors are not likely to identify with Black victims or to see them as family
or friends. Thus jurors are more likely to be horrified by the killing of a
White than of a Black, and more likely to act against the killer of a White
than against the killer of a Black." 2'
Although the procedures employed and the liberty interests at stake in
the civil context differ from the criminal context, it is reasonable to assume
that some of the above considerations apply in civil cases. It may well be
that vertical intra-group discrimination cases involving disfavored classes
are more difficult to prove due to an inability to identify and to empathize
with plaintiffs of a different race.122 Or, it may be that judges and jurors
are loath to "do anything" about vertical intra-group claims because,
unlike discrimination perpetuated by members of a disfavored group
against the majority (B 4 W), discrimination between members of a
disfavored group (B - B) is less threatening and does not undermine
notions of White hegemony and dominance.12 Either way, whether under
121. Id. at 252-53 (quoting SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND
DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989)).
122. To be sure, this would apply in any case where the victim is of a disfavored class
and not just in vertical intra-group situations. However, a lack of empathy towards persons
from disfavored classes may increase the likelihood that vertical intra-group claims will be
dismissed because the fact-finder may lack interest in both the plaintiff and the defendant.
123. The above theories suggest that plaintiffs will encounter the most difficulty
proving White on Black cases due to the inability of jurors to empathize with Black
plaintiffs and their higher regard for White defendants. In addition, the pattern in White
on Black cases would be consistent with, if not reinforcing of, existing power relations and
therefore arguably less alarming to these jurors. According to this analysis, the cases would
be sorted as follows (in increasing difficulty of proof for plaintiffs):
Defendant B W B W
Victim W W B B
Difficulty of Proof
The above reasoning may explain why White defendants are less likely to receive the
death penalty than Black defendants in cases with Black victims. It may also explain why
racial discrimination cases, which typically involve a White defendant and a Black plaintiff,
are generally difficult to prove. However, as I explained in the text accompanying notes
82-93, this reasoning is not wholly convincing given the unique focus and historical origin of
anti-discrimination law. Unlike in criminal cases, where laws are designed to deter and to
punish criminal activity regardless of race (at least in theory), anti-discrimination law was
originally directed at a particular type of interaction, i.e., discrimination by the majority
against a minority. Because White-on-Black discrimination is what anti-discrimination law
was initially designed to address, that law tends to be more suspicious of this pattern than of
the reverse. As a result, White-on-Black cases may actually be easier to establish than
Black-on-Black cases. Under this reasoning, the cases would be sorted as follows (in
increasing difficulty of proof):
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a victim-centered approach or a power theory, plaintiffs in vertical intra-
group cases involving disfavored classes will encounter difficulty
convincing White judges and jurors to take these cases seriously.
3. Acceptance
Even if they are neither skeptical nor indifferent, judges and jurors
may be more accepting of vertical intra-group discrimination, especially
when a lawsuit involves litigants from a disfavored group and the fact-
finders are from that group (e.g., Black jurors examining allegations of
Black-on-Black discrimination). These jurors may be reluctant to award
relief and to give too much credence to intra-group claims because doing
so would "air dirty laundry" 124 and could potentially deflect attention from
Defendant B W W B
Victim W w B B
Difficulty of Proof
124. "Airing dirty laundry" refers to a desire to avoid highlighting or exposing
dysfunctional behavior within a particular community or social group. This desire may
stem from simple embarrassment, or it may arise from a perceived need to prevent further
reduction in the stature of an already oppressed and maligned group (the argument being
that there is nothing to be gained from providing another basis for criticism of the group).
In addition, the desire not to air dirty laundry may be driven by a fear that to reveal
reprehensible conduct within a community (especially within a historically oppressed
group) will undermine that community's criticism of similar conduct when perpetuated
against the group by outsiders. In other words, it is hard to criticize another group for the
same type of behavior in which one's own group participates.
Discussions of a need to avoid airing dirty laundry often arise when one member
of a community levels a charge against another member of that community. Thus, when
Anita Hill, an African-American woman, accused then-Judge Clarence Thomas, an
African-American man, of sexual harassment during Senate hearings to consider Judge
Thomas' appointment to the Supreme Court, some commentators within the Black
community argued that even if Judge Thomas was guilty of misconduct, it would be better
not to expose this fact. See Frontline.: Clarence Thomas and Anita Hill: Public Hearing,
Pnivate Pain (PBS television broadcast Oct. 13, 1992) (on file with author). Similarly, when
Desiree Washington, an African-American woman, accused boxer Mike Tyson, an African-
American man, of rape (a crime for which he was subsequently convicted), some African
Americans thought that perhaps she should have refrained from exposing his behavior and
bringing charges against such a high profile African-American athlete. See Ellen
Goodman, Only Now Do They Begin To Wonder What's Eating Mike Tyson, TAMPA
TRIB., July 7, 1997, at 7; Wayne Lockwood, Suit By Tyson's Victim Is Justified After What
He Has Put Her Through, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 27, 1992, at Cl. Certainly one
can find other explanations for these views (e.g., a tendency to minimize the pernicious
consequences of sexism and sexual assault within the African-American community or a
tendency to subordinate gender concerns to race concerns). But a desire not to air dirty
laundry seems also to have been present.
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the problem of White on Black discrimination, which may be perceived as
more pressing.
This ranking of discrimination (e.g., the belief or perception that some
discriminatory acts are worse than others) not only afflicts members of
disfavored groups, but extends as well to Whites. I have already explored
why some Whites may view Black-on-Black discrimination with skepticism
and indifference. They may also be more accepting of this behavior. As I
explained in Part IV(A)(1), cross-group action (e.g., Whites harming
Blacks or Blacks harming Whites) shapes and defines understandings of
discrimination in the United States." The absence of such action may
suggest that a plaintiff's injury did not result from discrimination, or that it
resulted from a "less egregious" form of discrimination. Thus, if a Black
man were to discriminate against another Black man (e.g., for being
insufficiently masculine), some may view this with less urgency than
White-on-Black discrimination because the former does not raise the
specter of White supremacy (at least not as directly or as obviously) and
does not carry the same historical baggage as cross-group discrimination.
In short, given this country's horrible history of White-on-Black racial
subordination, Black-on-Black discrimination simply may not raise the
same red flags that White-on-Black discrimination does. Importantly, in
vertical intra-group discrimination cases, White acceptance, unlike Black
acceptance, would not be driven by a desire to suppress dirty laundry, but
rather by the absence, or a reduced sense, of moral obligation as an
impetus for action."'
The problem of White acceptance is aggravated by what I call the
Imus Syndrome.'27 When persons within marginalized or disfavored
groups engage in the same egregious behavior for which the majority is
criticized, the majority's conduct somehow gets excused and the severity of
the underlying behavior is minimized because, "well, it can't be all that bad
if they (people of color) are doing it too!"" Historical examples of this
125. See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
126. See Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT'L J. PSYCHOL.
117, 119 (2000) (citing studies establishing that "[b]oth moral outrage, in which society and
social institutions are blamed for the disadvantaged, and existential guilt, in which people
feel personal blame for the disadvantaged, lead to a readiness to perform prosocial
actions").
127. In April 2007, radio talk show host Don Imus called the Rutgers University
women's basketball team a bunch of "nappy-headed ho's." See David Carr, Networks
Condemn Remarks by Imus, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2007, at B7. The remark caused a
hailstorm of controversy during which Imus lost his MSNBC cable show as well as his radio
broadcast. The comment also led to debate about its appropriateness given that similarly
racist and misogynistic language is often used by Black rap artists in their lyrics. See Jeff
Leeds, Hearing Focuses on Language and Violence in Rap Music, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26,
2007, at A24; Kelefa Sanneh, Don't Blame Hip-Hop, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2007, at E1.
128. For analysis of a related phenomenon, see Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 3 (using
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phenomenon abound. The Imus Syndrome surfaces when Whites attempt
to excuse the horrors of slavery in the Americas by pointing to the
participation of Africans in the slave trade; when Whites attempt to justify
their use of the "n" word by pointing to its use among some people of
color; when observers attempt to minimize White-on-Black police brutality
by pointing to the presence of Black officers at the scene of the crime; or
when employers seek to justify certain restrictions on "ethnic" attire
because some historically black colleges and universities have adopted
similar requirements. During the 2008 democratic presidential primaries,
former President Clinton even sought to refute allegations that his
criticism of Barack Obama was racist by arguing that he had expressed
more optimism about Obama's chances of prevailing in the general
election than some African-American observers.129 Ironically, in all of
these cases, various social actors use intra-group acts to excuse their own
behavior. Inherent in this analysis is the suggestion that there is nothing
wrong with the intra-group activity-or that no one should be punished
because all are engaging in the same bad acts. In other words, instead of
being viewed as problematic across the board, the pervasiveness of the
conduct at issue across groups (by both the majority and the minority)
seems somehow to render it more acceptable. This does not bode well for
persons challenging either White-on-Black or Black-on-Black
discriminatory conduct.
In sum, if the above is true (e.g., skepticism because vertical intra-
group discrimination does not conform to established understandings of
discrimination; indifference because the offender and the plaintiff are of
color; and acceptance because same-group participation seemingly
ameliorates the severity of the harm and the absence of a White
perpetrator eliminates White moral obligation as a possible catalyst for
action), then plaintiffs will have a tough row to hoe when both the plaintiff
and the decision maker are members of the same group. Direct evidence
may overcome some of these hurdles. But circumstantial evidence leaves
too much room for doubt to flourish.
B. Horizontal Intra-Group Discrimination
Thus far, I have examined difficulties that arise when the decision
maker and the plaintiff are of the same group. Even when one alters this
configuration, challenges remain.130 Assume, for example, in the Burch
the controversy surrounding the NBA's dress code to demonstrate the ways in which
supportive testimony by some African Americans has been used to refute allegations of
racism by other African Americans).
129. Nghtline: Interiew with Kate Snow (ABC News television broadcast, Aug. 5,
2008).
130. In many colorism and identity performance cases, vertical and horizontal claims
2010 ] 68 9
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case that the manager was White and a lighter-toned African American
was preferred to Burch (who you will recall has dark skin). Again, this
scenario is atypical because in the usual discrimination case, the decision
maker displays a preference for someone of one race over someone of a
different race (e.g., the manager would prefer a White employee to one
who was African American)."' The above may be depicted as follows:
Typical Case Horizontal Intra-Group Cases
Decision Maker W W
B W B B
(Plaintiff) (Preferred Em/ee) (Plaintiff) (Preferred Em/ee)
overlap (i.e., the decision maker, the plaintiff, and the preferred employee are all of the
same class), thereby adding additional layers of complexity. See, e.g., Brack v. Shoney's
Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 938, 947-49 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (darker-toned Black plaintiff alleging
that Black supervisor favored lighter-toned Blacks); Walker v. Internal Revenue Serv., 742
F. Supp. 670, 670 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (lighter-toned Black plaintiff alleging that Black
supervisor favored darker-toned Blacks).
131. To be sure, the selection of someone in the same protected class as the plaintiff
does not necessarily preclude a claim, especially following the Supreme Court's decision in
O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996) (holding, in an age
discrimination case, that replacement of plaintiff with someone who was also within the
protected class under Age Discrimination in Employment Act did not void the plaintiff's
claim). Since O'Connor, some courts have held that employers are not entitled to
judgment as a matter of law just because the plaintiff and her replacement are in the same
protected class. See Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 145-46 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (collecting
cases). See also Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1138 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that non-
White employee can establish a prima facie case of discrimination without proving that her
job was filled by White person). However, other courts have taken a different view. See,
e.g., Brown v. McLean, 159 F.3d 898, 905-06 (4th Cir. 1998) (allowing claim only when
there has been significant period of time between the adverse action and decision to hire
replacement or when the hiring of another person within the protected class was calculated
to hide unlawful discrimination against the plaintiff); Sidique v. Univ. of Pittsburg, No. 02-
365, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20473, at *28 n.10 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2003) (noting that
plaintiff's claims were "undermined by the remarkable degree of ethnic diversity reflected"
in department to which plaintiff sought admittance and observing that while this evidence
"cannot conclusively demonstrate the employer's actions were not discriminatorily
motivated, it is not wholly irrelevant and serves to further emphasize the weaknesses
otherwise reflected in the plaintiffs case"); Walker v. Boys & Girls Club of Am., 38 F.
Supp. 2d 1326, 1336-37 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (holding that replacing plaintiff with someone of
the same protected class, without additional evidence of racial bias, negated the inference
of discrimination); Ferdinand v. Borden Chem. & Plastics, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13921, at
*17 n.5 (E.D. La. Sept. 1, 1998) (noting that while replacement of plaintiff with someone of
her class does not "automatically entitle defendant to a summary judgment[, iun such a
situation, the Court must examine all the evidence for other indicia of discrimination
relating to the discharge").
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Although one can explain why decision makers may make intra-group
distinctions among people of the same race, one problem in horizontal
intra-group discrimination cases is proving that the discriminator is a bad
actor. As noted in Part I, U.S. anti-discrimination law has been historically
concerned with the total exclusion of people of color from the workplace
or from particular job categories within the workplace.'32 Laws were
directed at this across-the-board intolerance, what I call first-generation
discrimination. Applying this paradigm to the Burch case, the manager
would hire no African Americans, at least not as servers. Of course this is
not the sole or arguably the primary way in which discrimination operates
in the United States today.'33 White-only institutions and job categories
are for the most part now suspect, and presumably the market will no
longer tolerate such places." Instead of wholesale exclusion, we are more
likely to see intra-group "screening" or "preferencing," or second-
generation discrimination, to determine who will be included and
excluded. With second-generation discrimination, employers prefer a
subset of people of color, those who dress, talk, and act a certain way, or
who have a certain lightness or darkness to their skin tones.
The problem is that employers who engage in this type of subtly
nuanced discrimination are not likely to be viewed as "evil" because unlike
the bigots of the past, these employers are welcoming towards some
people of color. To accuse them of unlawful discrimination when they are
hiring people of color, and therefore making some progress, may strike
fact-finders as simply wrong or petty. In this scenario, a plaintiff's claims
may be viewed as unreasonable whining. Indeed, one can easily envision a
defendant's closing arguments in such a case, which might proceed as
follows:
132. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
United States, 422 U.S. 299 (1977); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977).
133. Although women and people of color have access to most employment arenas,
glass ceilings remain in place in many professions (especially in the executive and
managerial ranks) as well as unspoken numerical limits on the desired number of people of
color and women. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, JOB PATTERNS
FOR MINORITIES AND WOMEN IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY (2007), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/employment/jobpat-eeol/2007/index.html
(demonstrating that women and minorities hold fewer managerial and executive positions
than men and Whites). See also U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, JOB
PATTERNS FOR MINORITIES AND WOMEN IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (2005)
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/employment/jobpat-eeo4/2005/index.html
(demonstrating that women and minorities have fewer high salaried positions than men and
Whites).
134. The only time such institutions would pass muster is when there are no or very
few people of color in the qualified labor pool. One suspects, however, that as time passes,
these instances will be increasingly rare. See Carbado, Gulati & Ramachandran, supra note
12, at 117 (making a similar observation about male-only workplaces).
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Come on, you have got to be kidding me. My client hires people
of color, but that isn't good enough. Now the plaintiff is
complaining because my client doesn't hire the right kind of
people of color. His employees are not dark enough or they don't
have braided hairstyles?!?! Can my client do anything right? Give
me a break (as counsel scratches his head in a perplexed fashion
and walks slowly, tragically to his chair). Is this type of petty
whining really what anti-discrimination law was designed to
redress (as counsel takes his seat)?
In short, the presence of members of plaintiff's race in the workplace will
generate the same sort of skepticism and indifference (if not hostility) that
one sees in vertical intra-group discrimination cases.135
In addition to the above, plaintiffs in horizontal intra-group
discrimination cases likely will encounter difficulty establishing an
inference of discrimination unless they can show (1) that someone of a
different class (e.g., a different race) was treated better than the plaintiff;
or (2) that no one in the plaintiff's class was treated better than the
plaintiff. The first proposition is problematic because horizontal claims
have not historically involved cross-group (e.g., Black/White) comparisons.
Although the Supreme Court has held that the replacement of a plaintiff
with someone of the same class does not preclude a claim of
discrimination,"' replacement of the plaintiff with someone of a different
class remains the paradigmatic means of establishing an inference of
discrimination."' Yet, this inference is not readily available in intra-group
cases because the comparison is generally between individuals of the same
class. The second proposition is problematic because intra-group claims by
definition involve a preferencing of someone in the plaintiff's group over
the plaintiff.138
135. Indeed, employers in intersectionality cases often make this argument, asserting
that Black women or Asian women could not be subject to discrimination if other women
and other people of their race were in the workplace. See supra notes 39-44 and
accompanying text. Although courts have rejected these arguments, plaintiffs in
intersectionality cases still have very low success rates.
136. O'Connor, 517 U.S. at 312. See also Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S.
581, 598 n.10 (1999) (citing precedent in which Supreme Court included disparate
treatment among members of same protected class in its definition of "discrimination").
137. See supra note 131. See also Moore v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-107 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66973, at *13, *15, *22 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 19, 2006) (holding that Black
plaintiff would have failed to state a prima facie case if her only evidence was that she was
replaced by someone within her class, but finding prima facie case established because
plaintiff was treated differently than similarly situated White individuals); Ferdinand v.
Borden Chem. & Plastics, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13921, at *17 n.5 (E.D. La. Sept. 1, 1998)
(same).
138. Courts routinely rule against plaintiffs who are unable to show that their
employers gave preferential treatment to other employees who were similarly situated to
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Brack v. Shoney's, Inc.13 9 effectively demonstrates these complexities.
Brack, who was African American, alleged that his manager, who was also
African American, discriminated against Brack because of his dark skin
tone. The court quickly rejected several of Brack's colorism contentions
because someone lighter than Brack was also treated poorly"m and
someone darker than Brack was treated well.141
At first blush, the Court's reasoning in Brack seems persuasive. Intra-
group claims are strongest when there is some basis for distinguishing the
plaintiff from others in his class. Thus, if a decision maker distinguishes
between a Latino applicant from Puerto Rico and a Latino applicant from
Cuba based upon national origin, then an intra-group claim based upon
national origin discrimination seems plausible. But, in an intra-group case
based on a Latino plaintiff's dark skin tone, if the defendant treats another
dark-skinned Latino better than the plaintiff and a lighter-toned Latino
worse than the plaintiff, then a claim of colorism seems improbable.
Unless the defendant is attempting to cover up discrimination after the
fact,142 then one could reasonably conclude that the defendant was
motivated by something other than color.
The problem with the above analysis is that it overlooks that
discrimination often is driven by not just one causal factor, but by several.
That is to say, discrimination is rarely just about one variable, like skin
color. Indeed, in many colorism cases, lurking in the background are
issues of language, class, national origin, age, and sometimes sexuality. 43
The same holds true for identity performance claims, where it may not be
the plaintiff and who were not members of plaintiffs protected class. See, e.g., Antonetti v.
Abbott Labs, 563 F.3d 587, 592 (7th Cir. 2009); Merritt v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 321 F.
App'x 410, 413 (5th Cir. 2009); Oliver v. Nat'l Beef Packing Co., 294 F. App'x. 455, 458
(11th Cir. 2008); Fuelling v. New Vision Med. Labs., 284 F. App'x. 247, 255-56 (6th Cir.
2008).
139. Brack v. Shoney's, Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 938, 941-46 (W.D. Tenn. 2003).
140. See id. at 949-50.
141. See id.
142. See Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1561 n.17 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that law
school's subsequent offer of employment to female did not preclude plaintiffs claim of race
and gender discrimination because offer was made after plaintiff had complained of
discrimination and had filed her lawsuit and "[b]y that time, the Law School was on notice
that its employment actions would be subject to scrutiny").
143. Sometimes these issues do not merely lurk, but are part of the plaintiffs claim.
See, e.g., Lindsay v. Pizza Hut of Am., 57 F. App'x 648 (6th Cir. 2003) (alleging
discrimination based on race, color, and gender); Salas v. Wis. Dep't of Corr., 429 F. Supp.
2d 1056 (W.D. Wis. 2006) (alleging discrimination based on age, race, and national origin);
Arrocha v. City Univ. of N.Y., No. CV-02-1868 (SJF)(LB), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4486
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2004) (alleging discrimination based on color and national origin);
Sidique v. Univ. of Pittsburg, No. 02-365, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20473 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 3,
2003) (alleging discrimination based on race, color and/or national origin); Rios v.
Aramark Corp., 139 F. Supp. 2d 210 (D.P.R. 2001) (alleging age and color discrimination).
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just the plaintiff's hair, but hair, color, and dress in combination that lead
to the plaintiff's adverse treatment. Intra-group claims are thus layered,
and a plaintiff could plausibly argue that a defendant was motivated not
just by her dark skin, but by the fact that she was a dark brown African
American who wore locks and was poor.
Again, the Brack case is useful in demonstrating these points. In the
case, there were several employees of plaintiff's skin tone. As suggested
above, some were treated better and some were treated worse, or at least
as bad as, the plaintiff. What is interesting about the case is that the
plaintiff was not only dark-skinned, but he had presumably tightly curled
hair'" and was gay.'45 His manager repeatedly referred to him as her "little
black sheep,"'46 a name that was picked up by others in the workplace.
Interestingly, this moniker could have referred to the dark color of the
plaintiff's skin, the "wooly" texture of his hair, or to his being the black
sheep of the workplace because of his sexuality. It therefore reflected the
complexity of the plaintiff's identity as well as the complexity of others'
responses to it. While sexuality or skin tone alone may have been
insufficient to lead to discriminatory conduct, the combination of these two
"undesirable" characteristics may well have placed the plaintiff over the
line of acceptability.147 In light of these complexities, the fact that a darker-
skinned employee was treated better than the plaintiff and that a lighter-
toned employee was treated worse should not preclude the plaintiff's claim
144. 249 F. Supp. 2d at 943.
145. Id. at 942-43.
14 6. Id.
147. This may also explain why skin color does not in all cases lead to the same
outcome. The combination of an undesirable marker and a valued characteristic may
ameliorate the stigma associated with the undesirable marker. For example, Justice
Clarence Thomas appears to have done quite well notwithstanding his darker skin tone.
One could argue that for some people his conservative politics and reserved demeanor may
ameliorate negative stereotypes associated with darkness. The same holds for Barack
Obama. President Obama identifies as African American. But, he is arguably more
palatable to a wider audience than say Jesse Jackson or Al Sharpton because of the way in
which he performs his identity. (Note that racial performances are not necessarily strategic
or conscious. They may be unconscious choices made in environments where different
performances carry significant weight.) Notwithstanding his liberal politics and his race,
Obama is highly educated. He speaks in moderate tones. He rarely talks of race directly
unless circumstances force him to do so (e.g., his response to the issue of Reverend
Jeremiah Wright) or he makes a rare political "mistake" (e.g., his comments on the arrest
of Professor Skip Gates). His dress and grooming are conservative. Because he is the
antithesis of the stereotype of the Black radical of the 1960s, or the more passionately
outspoken racial justice advocates of the 1980s and 1990s, he presumably has broader
appeal. See supra notes 3 and 35 for additional analysis. The same holds true for women
and gender performances. A woman may not be desired in certain occupations, but she
may do okay if she plays the game, does not shake things up too much, and performs
according to expectations (e.g., by not being too aggressive if the desired role is femininity,
or by being one of the boys if the desired role is toughness).
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if the discriminatory act was based on a combination of hair, color, and
sexuality.
In short, the Brack case underscores the fallacy of one-dimensional
conceptions of identity and discrimination based thereon. The problem of
course is that when a plaintiff's allegations become very specific and
textured-in other words, reflective of our messy realities-the plaintiff
risks backlash, ridicule, and criticism for engaging in over victimization. In
this context, instead of the defendant's actions being treated with
skepticism, the plaintiff's allegations will be. The bottom line is this: if it is
already hard to prove that a defendant was motivated by race, something
that is supposedly fixed and known, then plaintiffs face a Herculean task
proving discrimination based upon a combination of factors when, as I
discuss in the next section, these factors are murky and when defendants
will offer many alternative justifications for their behavior.
C Indeterminate or Murky Markers
Even if a judge or jury could be persuaded to take intra-group
screening seriously, proof problems remain because intra-group markers
are less defined than those with which U.S. anti-discrimination law
historically has been concerned. For better or worse, that law has relied
upon fairly rigid classification systems which drew sharp lines between
different races, genders, and religions, among other things. In these
systems, people were deemed to be either Black, White, Yellow, or Red; 1
male or female;149 Christian, Jewish, or Muslim. For the most part,
Americans knew (or assumed they knew) where the lines were and in a
comparative, cross-group framework, it was at least possible to establish
when a defendant crossed them. 150
148. For historical analysis of racial classification systems in the United States, see
Christine B. Hickman, The Dev7 and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, African
Americans and the US. Census, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1161, 1171-87 (1997); Carrie Lynn H.
Okizaki, What Are You?: Hapa-Girl and Multiracial Identity, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 463,
469-84 (2000); Luther Wright, Jr., Who's Black, Who's White, and Who Cares:
Reconceptualizing the United States's Definition of Race and Racial Classification, 48
VAND. L. REv. 513, 522-42 (1995).
149. For discussion of gender classification systems, see Julie A. Greenberg, Defining
Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collsion Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIz. L.
REv. 265, 269-78 (1999); Leslie Pearlman, Transsexualism as Metaphor: the Collision of
Sex and Gender, 43 BUFF. L. REv. 835, 842-44 (1995).
150. Of course, there were always individuals who challenged these rigid and artificial
classification schemes and who were not easily categorized. See generally IAN HANEY
L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (10th anniversary ed., 2006)
(examining various methods employed by U.S. courts to determine the racial status of
individuals in the early 20' century and the contradictory results these courts produced);
Ariela Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-
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This is not true in colorism and identity performance cases. There are
many shades of brown, many accents, and many ways to perform one's
race or gender. Thus, convincing a jury that a defendant thought the
plaintiff's hair was "too ethnic," her accent "too pronounced," or her skin
a little "too dark" can present a formidable challenge. Plaintiffs are in
essence required to prove a defendant's subjective intent without any
"objectively clear" markers to back up their assertions. Absent direct
evidence, and in the face of defendant's denial, query whether this can be
done.
At least one court anticipated the Murky Marker Problem early in the
evolution of colorism claims and expressed reservations about engaging in
line drawing, noting that it refused "to create a cause of action that would
place it in the unsavory business of measuring skin color and determining
whether the skin pigmentation of the parties was sufficiently different to
form the basis of a lawsuit."' The line-drawing problem is complicated by
the fact that in many intra-group cases, the statistical sample is small and
thus of limited probative value.' This is particularly true in promotion
and discharge cases where there are sometimes too few employees of color
in the workplace to establish color bias with any degree of certainty.153
Even in failure to hire cases, plaintiffs are hindered due to the frequent
absence of information regarding the skin color of applicants.154 If
plaintiffs cannot establish that persons with darker skin tones applied, then
the absence of such persons in the employer's workforce will have little
probative weight.'
A similar murkiness problem arises in identity performance cases,
Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109 (1998) (examining ways in which law and legal trials
shaped various meanings of race).
151. Sere v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 628 F. Supp. 1543, 1546 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
152. See Rios v. Aramark Corp., 139 F. Supp. 2d 210, 224-25 (D.P.R. 2001) (finding
plaintiffs' statistical support flawed because it "fails to provide important information
regarding the pool of applicants" and because plaintiffs' discharge data "pertain[ed] only to
two positions and 'such a small statistical sample carries little or no probative force."'
(quoting LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 848-49 (1st Cir. 1993))).
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. To be sure, even if an employer has never hired a woman or person of color,
plaintiffs can bring still systemic discrimination claims based upon the difference between
the racial and gender composition of the defendant's workplace and the relevant labor
pool. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342 n.23 (1977) (stating
that "the company's inability to rebut the inference of discrimination came not from a
misuse of statistics [concerning the appropriate labor market] but from 'the inexorable
zero,"' i.e. the complete absence of people of color in the position at issue). The problem in
colorism and identity performance cases is that, unlike race and gender, demographic
information concerning the relative skin tone of individuals or their identity performances
is not readily available. Thus, systemic claims on the basis of colorism and identity
performance may be particularly difficult to prove.
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where the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are not always clear.
For example, are prohibitions against all-braided hairstyles, low-lying
prison-culture jeans, or rap music race-based, class-based, both race- and
class-based, or neither?1 6 Is a dashiki an expression of racial identity?
What about a FUBU sweatshirt? How should courts decide what is a
reflection of racial identity and what is merely sloppy, rebellious, or
otherwise nonconformist behavior? 157
The Murky Marker Problem is more complicated than the above
analysis suggests for it may be that even if one could devise effective ways
of determining where the lines are, some might question whether anti-
discrimination law should extend this far.'5 There seems to exist an
established hierarchy of markers, meaning that some markers carry more
weight and are received with greater legitimacy (e.g., gender, race,
156. This characterization is important because racial classifications are subject to
more suspicion and legal regulation than socio-economic distinctions. Compare Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227, 235-40 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to
racial classifications) with San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(subjecting class-based distinctions to only rational basis review). For examination of the
growing problem of class inequality in the United States, see LAW AND CLASS IN AMERICA:
TRENDS SINCE THE COLD WAR (Paul D. Carrington & Trina Jones eds., 2006). See also the
collected essays in Symposium Issue: Race and Socioeconomic Class: Examining an
Increasingly Complex Tapestry, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. i (Trina Jones special ed.,
2009).
157. Some might question whether identity performance claims assume a
homogeneity within races-that each race has a finite style of dress or racial expression
unique to that race-that does not exist. This concern, however, misses the mark. The
issue is not whether identity performances are solely and exclusively engaged in by one
racial group, but whether those performances are generally associated with a particular
race. Thus, when White suburban youth wear low-lying jeans and drive cars vibrating to
the rhythm of rap music, the question is not whether this activity is limited to one racial
group, but whether White parents object to the music because it is associated with Black
(perhaps lower-class Black) culture. For analysis of the relationship between racial and
class identity, see Trina Jones, Foreword: Race and Socioeconomic Class: Examining an
Increasingly Complex Tapestry, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. i, iii-viii (2009).
158. This concern is particularly pressing in identity performance cases where some
may question whether the imposition of uniform standards upon employees is the sort of
harm the law should redress. See infra note 163-64 and accompanying text. The argument
is, as one sees in dress and grooming cases, that these workplace restrictions are "minor
infringements" because the employee is free to perform her identity any way she chooses
outside of the workplace. And if workplace limitations are too great, the argument goes,
then the employee can elect to secure employment elsewhere. See supra notes 73-76 and
accompanying text.
The problem with this argument is that only some people will be required to modify
their behavior in order to fit into the workplace. Moreover, if the employer's rules require
conformity with a particular type of racial or gender performance (or nonperformance),
these rules may squelch the type of diversity this country has celebrated in recent years.
Such practices thus thwart anti-discrimination law's goals of promoting equality of
employment opportunities and removing barriers that favor one class of employees over
another. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,429-30 (1971).
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religion, national/geographic origin)15 9 than others (e.g., skin color, hair,
accent, dress). The markers at the top of the hierarchy may have earned
their place because of historical pedigree (e.g., their extensive use in the
past as a basis for subordination)," because they implicate fundamental
rights, or because they are seen as beyond the control of the individual
(which makes it particularly unfair to rely upon them in contexts where
they are irrelevant).'6 In a society that views claims based on established
markers with suspicion and hostility,162 one must question whether the will
exists to expand anti-discrimination law to include less well-known, less
understood, and indeed, murky markers. 63
159. This is readily seen in equal protection doctrine where race, religion, national
origin, and gender are treated as suspect and semi-suspect classifications. Even within the
equal protection hierarchy, sub-tiers exist where governmental classifications based on race
are subject to strict scrutiny (the highest level of judicial review) while gender classifications
appear to be subject to intermediate scrutiny (or mid-level review). See Adarand, 515 U.S.
at 227, 235-40 (regarding race); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (regarding
gender).
160. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Brennan,
White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (commenting on the significance of
America's history of race discrimination for purposes of constitutional analysis);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 190-92 (1964) (same).
161. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685-86 (1973) ("[S]ince sex, like
race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of
birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of
their sex would seem to violate 'the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should
bear some relationship to individual responsibility."' (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972))); Watkins v. U.S. Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1446 (9th Cir: 1988)
(discussing immutability analysis and whether it should apply to sexuality classifications),
superseded by 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated en banc and affd on other grounds,
875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989). For a thoughtful critique of the Supreme Court's reliance
upon immutability, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 150-60 (1980) (asserting that the test should be relevance to legislative
purpose instead of immutability); J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J.
2313, 2323-24 (1997) (arguing that the social meaning of a trait is more important than
immutability).
162. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
163. Even if the will exists, one might question whether such expansion is advisable.
As one commentator on this paper noted, "perhaps intra-racial discrimination is less
frequent than other forms of discrimination, and perhaps the more commonplace forms of
discrimination should be addressed first?" Another commentator worried that putting
identity performance claims on the same footing as traditional gender and racial
discrimination claims would open the floodgates to frivolous litigation. For example,
should individuals employed in certain professions be allowed to bring identity
performance claims because their employers prefer that they wear professional attire (e.g.,
white lab coats for doctors and suits for lawyers appearing in court)? Should a Greek
person be able to sue if he cannot wear a toga and sandals to work? Should a Black
employee be able to sue if he is terminated for refusing to turn his rap music down to a
reasonable level (and his argument is not that rap music is being treated differently from
other music in the office, but that Black employees prefer to hear music played louder than
their office counterparts and thus the music volume rule has an adverse impact on Blacks)?
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This concern is particularly pressing given the tension between
equality and autonomy that lies at the heart of anti-discrimination law. To
be sure, this tension has always existed" and surfaces whenever courts are
asked to expand anti-discrimination law in a meaningful way. Although
To be sure, any expansion of grounds for recovery risks meritless claims and will raise
the usual slippery-slope counterarguments. Yet, without changing existing analytical
frameworks, the legal system can readily handle most of the above concerns. As with all
discrimination cases, in identity performance cases, courts must first determine whether an
employer's requirements are race-related or perpetuate racial stereotypes. As the Supreme
Court has noted, discerning the latter will involve consideration of "context, local custom,
and historical usage." Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456 (2006). If requirements
are not racially motivated or do not have a disparate effect on a racial group, then there
would be no legal basis on which to proceed and the case would be over. If, however, a
neutral policy has a disparate impact on a protected group, then the court must ask whether
there is a legitimate business reason for the requirement. If the answer to that question is
yes, then the requirement would survive. If it is no, the requirement would be struck down.
Applying this analysis to the claims mentioned earlier, the regulation of music levels
would be upheld, as it would be hard to see racial animus in the adoption of such a rule.
Even if the rule has a racially disparate impact, in just about any workplace the employer
would be able to argue persuasively that loud music interferes with productivity (e.g., the
ability of all workers in the workplace to concentrate and to perform their jobs adequately).
Similarly, the lab coat and suit requirements would be upheld as it is difficult to discern
racial animus in their adoption and implementation. The impact analysis is a bit trickier,
however, as the rule would limit the hajib-wearing doctor or the dashiki-wearing litigator.
The essential question there would be whether a conventional business suit is in fact
required for professional legitimacy and decorum-or whether generally accepted
professional norms are themselves discriminatory. As for the toga-wearing Greek, the
court might require some showing that the performance at issue is not reflective of an
idiosyncratic personal preference, but that it is deeply tied to the socio-political history of a
particular group and is a significant component of that group's identity. This would be
similar to the type of analysis courts engage in when determining if a belief is religious or
simply a matter of personal preference. See, e.g., Brown v. Pena, 441 F. Supp. 1382, 1384-
85 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (rejecting employee's claim that his need to ingest Kozy Kitten Cat
Food was a religious practice covered by Title VII). To be sure, this sort of line-drawing
risks taking courts into the swamps of subjectivity and relativism. Some observers will
surely argue, however, that the difficulty of the challenge should not deter the tackling of it
and that conversation is needed to expose invisible, unstated, and potentially discriminatory
norms. Others will argue that is it better to not open Pandora's box at all and to bar all of
these claims.
164. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, CiviRights-A Challenge, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug.
31, 1963, at 21 (arguing against public accommodation laws on freedom of association
grounds); Robert H. Bork, Response, Civil Rights-A Rejoinder, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
Sept. 21, 1963, at 36; Editors, Civil Rights-A Reply, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 31, 1963, at
24. Although I have focused primarily on anti-discrimination legislation from the 1960s, it
is important to keep in mind that U.S. anti-discrimination law dates back at least as far as
the Reconstruction era. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend XV (prohibiting race-based
infringements on right to vote); U.S. CONsT. amend XIV (providing for equal protection);
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (outlawing slavery); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006) (prohibiting, among
other things, restrictions on the right to contract); 42 U.S.C. §. 1983 (2006) (prohibiting
deprivation of rights by those acting under color of state law); 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (2006)
(prohibiting conspiracies to interfere with exercise of civil rights).
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courts have been inclined to restrict autonomy in favor of equality when
dealing with the categorical exclusion of people from certain jobs or
institutions because of their race, sex, religion and other group-based
characteristics, it is not clear that this same balance will be struck in intra-
group cases. The issue is most pressing in identity performance cases
where certain performances (e.g., wearing makeup, braided hair, or ethnic
attire) are not only ambiguous, but are modifiable. Thus, any infringement
on opportunity will be characterized as a matter of individual choice and
not as a consequence of discrimination as Americans are accustomed to
conceptualizing it (i.e., many will assert that there would be no obstruction
if the plaintiff simply chose to put on makeup or to get rid of the braids).
In these cases, courts and commentators may question the extent to which
employees have a right to express all aspects of their identity in the
workplace and how much employer autonomy should be compromised in
pursuit of this objective.
D. Alternative Explanations
Finally, problems of proof arise in colorism and identity performance
cases because people differ along a variety of dimensions (e.g., on the basis
of race, color, hair, accent, class, gender, age, height, weight, educational
and family background, geographical origin, work experience, etc.)." No
two individuals are identical and there are countless ways to differentiate
among persons within a particular group. Thus, in colorism cases,
defendants can easily argue that it was not skin color, but rather something
else that led to the plaintiff's harm. For example, a defendant may assert
that any problems were due to a personality conflict or the plaintiff's bad
attitude, as was claimed in the landmark case of Walker v. Internal
Revenue Service.166 Or, a defendant may subtly suggest that the issue was
165. Indeed, often in discrimination cases, plaintiffs will allege multiple bases for the
defendant's allegedly discriminatory conduct. See supra note 143.
166. Walker v. Internal Revenue Serv., 742 F. Supp. 670, 672 (N.D. Ga. 1990);
Hansborough v. City of Elkhart Parks & Rec. Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 199, 207 (N.D. Ind. 1992)
(alluding to personality clashes between plaintiff and other employees as potential
justification for employer's action). See also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,
508 (1993) (finding that personal, rather than racial, animus may have caused adverse
action against plaintiff). For critique of the personal animus argument, see Mark S. Brodin,
The Demise of Circumstantial Proof in Employment Discrimination Litigation: St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks, Pretext, and the "Personality" Excuse, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 183, 186, 215-30 (1997) (arguing that the Supreme Court's acceptance of
"personality clashes as a nondiscriminatory justification ignores the effects of unconscious
bias and stereotyping and opens a gaping loophole in the law"); Chad Derum & Karen
Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity Presumption in Title VII and the Return to "No
Cause" Employment, 81 TEx. L. REV. 1177 (2003) (criticizing judicial move from a
presumption of unlawful discrimination to a nondiscriminatory personal animus
presumption).
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not the plaintiff's skin color, but the plaintiff's sexuality, as appeared to be
the case in Brack v. Shoney's, Inc.67 Or, a defendant may argue that the
problem was not due to skin color or identity performance, but to the
plaintiff's lack of qualifications or poor job performance.16
To be sure, the problem of alternative explanations also arises in
traditional cross-group cases. For example, imagine that Burch alleged
that he was poorly treated not because he was too dark, but because he
was not White. As with intra-group cases, the defendant would likely deny
this allegation and assert some other lawful reason for the action in
question (e.g., Burch's poor job performance or weak qualifications). The
difference in cross-racial cases is that in the United States the racial
difference (e.g., the fact that a White person was preferred over a Black
person) is itself suspicious and, when unexplained, creates an inference of
discrimination.169 Even with this inference, cross-group cases are difficult
to prove. 70
If cross-group cases are hard to prove, then plaintiffs face additional
hurdles with intra-group claims when dealing with markers like skin color
or hair-markers that are less defined and less widely understood bases for
discrimination. Because reliance upon these markers does not produce the
same degree of suspicion as does reliance upon traditional markers, the
burden on the defendant of coming forth with an alternative explanation is
lower.
V.
REASSESSING INTRA-GROUP CLAIMS
As stated at the outset, this Article's primary purpose is not to solve
the problems examined in Part IV, but rather to expose them. To the
extent, however, that intra-group preferencing reflects a key aspect of
contemporary discrimination, it is worthwhile to at least briefly consider
ways in which plaintiffs and those interested in combating discrimination
might respond to the problems identified herein. I offer two suggestions.
First, lawyers representing plaintiffs in intra-group cases must ensure (1)
that they understand the nature of these claims, (2) that they make
appropriate inquiries during discovery (e.g., by asking the right questions
in interviews, interrogatories, and depositions) to elicit the kind of
information required to persuade skeptical juries, (3) that they utilize
experts to explain the historical and contemporary meaning of color and
167. 249 F. Supp. 2d 938, 954 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (finding that "[p]laintiff cannot rely
on statements related to his sexual preference to support a claim of hostile work
environment based on race, because such statements are not related to plaintiffs color").
168. This is the most commonly asserted defense. See supra note 89.
169. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
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certain identity performances, and (4) that they anticipate and directly
engage objections to intra-group claims in response to motions to dismiss
and motions for summary judgment. In other words, these lawyers must
assume hostility to their clients' claims and must prepare to respond to it.
In order to do this work, lawyers must have ready access to
psychological and sociological studies, empirical data, and historical
records establishing that colorism and identity performance claims are not
made up, fictitious, or trivial. They must be able to show that the
discrimination on which these claims are based is deeply woven into the
social fabric of the United States, and as such, that it requires serious
reflection and attention. To the extent that scholars across disciplines can
assist in this effort by continuing to illuminate the very subtle and nuanced
ways in which discrimination happens both across and within groups,
plaintiffs stand a better chance.
These educational efforts must not only occur in the courtroom, they
must take place in lecture halls, newspapers, magazines, and on blogs, etc.
In the same way that social conservatives launched a deliberate media
campaign against anti-discrimination law,171 progressives must launch a
campaign to inform the public of the continued existence and dynamic
nature of discrimination.
This is easier said than done. One cannot underscore how vital and
difficult educational efforts are in a context where many people appear
exhausted thinking about inequality or seem convinced that discrimination
no longer exists-at least not on a widespread or pervasive basis.172 In
171. See Selmi, supra note 15, at 556.
172. Claims that the United States has entered a post-racial era, where race has lost
much of its salience, have been made with seemingly increasing frequency since the election
of Barack Obama as President. See, e.g., Mark Z. Barabak, IT'S OBAMA; Decisive
Victory Makes History, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at 1, available at
http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-na-ledeall5-2008nov05,0,2076534.story; Robert
Barnes & Michael D. Shear, Obama Makes History, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2008, at A01,
available athttp://www.washingtonpost.com/ wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/04/
AR2008110404246.html; Adam Nagourney, Obama Elected President as Racial Barrier
Falls, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at Al, available athttp://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/05/us/
politics/05elect.html; Shelby Steele, Obama's Post-Racial Promise, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5,
2008, at 31, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/opinion/la-oe-steele5-
2008nov05,0,1642069.story; Juan Williams, Obama's Color Line, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2007,
at A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/30/opinion/30williams.html. As
evidence that the United States has largely moved beyond race, observers point to the
presence of successful people of color in politics, business, education, entertainment, and
sports, among other areas-suggesting that previous barriers to opportunity have fallen.
Oddly, when highlighting these success stories, advocates of a post-racial America seem
implicitly to suggest that racism was largely absent from the lives of these successful people
of color and consequently that it is absent from the lives of all people of color. In other
words, because Oprah, Barack, Condi, Lebron, Cornel, and Skip "made it," racism no
longer exists, or is a rare occurrence perpetuated by fringe elements of U.S. society. These
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short, it is hard to educate a disinterested and sometimes hostile public.
The problems are magnified by the fact that while most Americans profess
agreement with an anti-discrimination norm, at least in principle, both
individual and systemic biases continue to exist.17 The complication in a
world heavily influenced by political correctness and post-racial ideologies
is that Americans find it challenging to talk about these biases in a
forthright and honest fashion.174 (Thus, not only are people disinterested,
they are also in denial.)"' Unlike fifty years ago, when Americans would
advocates do not seem to be suggesting that these extraordinary people achieved despite
America's racism. This distinction is important. The critical difference is the hidden
assumption about whether racism exists and the extent to which it remains a barrier to
opportunity. On the flawed assumption of a post-racial America, see generally Mario L.
Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky & Trina Jones, A Post-race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J.
967 (2010); Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589 (2009); john a. powell [sic],
Post-Raciahsm or Targeted Universalsm?, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 785 (2009); Reginald T.
Shuford, Why Affirmative Action Remains Essential in the Age of Obama, 31 CAMPBELL
L. REV. 503 (2009). The fact that many Americans believe discrimination no longer exists
(or is rarely practiced) is, of course, not new. On Americans' skepticism about the
continued prevalence of discrimination, see JOE R. FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA: ROOTS,
CURRENT REALITIES, AND FUTURE REPARATIONS 123-24 (2000) (citing various surveys);
HOWARD SCHUMAN, CHARLOTTE STEEH, LAWRENCE BOBO & MARIA KRYSAN, RACIAL
ATrITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND INTERPRETATIONS 166-67 (1997) (three-fourths of
Whites surveyed did not believe that Blacks face workplace discrimination); Deborah A.
Calloway, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning the Basic Assumption, 26 CONN.
L. REv. 997 (1994) (noting that judges, academics, and many lay Americans disbelieve the
basic assumption behind anti-discrimination law-that absent explanation, different
treatment of protected group members is the result of discrimination); Darren Lenard
Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 917 (2009) (analyzing historical
arguments against governmental measures to decrease racial inequality); Adam Goodheart,
The New America: A Change of Heart, AARP MAG., May/June 2004, at 43, 43-49, 82
(citing survey results showing majority of Whites deny persistent discrimination against
people of color).
173. People of color are more likely to be impoverished, to have lower incomes, to be
incarcerated, and to be uninsured and unemployed, among other things, than Whites. For
an examination of the statistical data, see Barnes, Chemerinsky & Jones, supra note 172, at
982-92. To be sure, other factors no doubt contribute to these statistical disparities, but
given the history of this country, it would be illogical to assume that structural racism is not
a critical contributing factor. For analysis of the various causes of racial inequality in the
workplace, see Note, "Trading Action for Access": The Myth of Meritocracy and the
Failure to Remedy Structural Discrimination, 121 HARv. L. REV. 2156 (2008); Kingsley R.
Browne, Statistical Proof of Discrimination: Beyond "Damned Lies", 68 WASH. L. REV.
477, 505-13 (1993) (arguing that racial and gender inequality result from lack of motivation
and skill).
174. I offer a sort of anecdotal support. I have taught a seminar on Race and the Law
at Duke Law School for over ten years. Even in an educational context, where students
feel comfortable and know each other, it is at times tremendously difficult to generate a
forthright discussion of race because students are (quite understandably) very concerned
about being labeled racist or bigoted by their peers.
175. See CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III & MARI J. MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go BACK:
MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 67-87 (1997) (asserting that anti-affirmative
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quite openly air their views of race, gender, national and regional origin,
sexuality, skin color, hair, etc., today, to a large extent, prejudiced beliefs
have gone underground. With few exceptions, open expression of
discriminatory views is no longer an acceptable part of public discourse in
the United States. While no one (well, very few people) would suggest
that the United States returns to the offensive and oppressive practices of
the Jim Crow era, social justice advocates must acknowledge that denial
and suppression make discriminatory views much more difficult to
excavate and to engage.
Addressing the issues raised in this Article, however, requires more
than sustained educational efforts. It seems that part of the problem with
proving intra-group claims lies in the comparative analytical framework
upon which U.S. anti-discrimination law rests. This framework has been
useful in providing redress for cross-group discrimination (e.g., cases
where an employer prefers one racial group and seeks totally to exclude
other groups, or where an employer hires people of color, but pays and
promotes them at a lower rate than Whites)."' Because a comparative
framework is helpful in ferreting out inequality in these circumstances, it
makes sense to keep it.
Yet, for the reasons I have been explaining, strict adherence to this
framework creates difficulties for plaintiffs litigating intra-group claims
because in these cases there is seemingly no cross-group comparison. Or is
there? Perhaps a partial solution in intra-group cases would be to not
compare the plaintiff to someone within her own racial group (or at least
not to end with that comparison). Thus, a darker African American would
not be compared to a lighter African American. A Latina woman with an
accent would not be compared to a Latina woman without an accent. The
African-American woman with dreads would not be compared to the
African-American woman with chemically processed hair. This sort of
intra-group comparison merely cloaks the real problem, which in the
context of racial discrimination is the imposition of racially normative
criteria."' What is needed is an analytical framework that will expose what
action discourse denies existence of past and continuing racism); Hutchinson, supra note
172, at 918-19; Bill Maxwell, White America, Denial Won'tErase Racism, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Dec. 6, 2000, at 15A.
176. Unfortunately, in some quarters, some people believe that it is still acceptable to
openly discriminate on the basis of age and sexuality.
177. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302
(7th Cir. 1988) (gender claim); Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D.
Tex. 1981) (gender claim).
178. In other words, the problem is not the total exclusion of Black people because
they are all undesirable, but rather employers preferring a particular type of Black person,
or a particular type of woman. Thus, if employers do not want people who are too dark,
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these criteria are.
I suggest the benchmark for comparison should not be the other
person of color in the workplace (to whom the plaintiff is compared in
most intra-group cases), but rather the employer's normative conception
of what constitutes the ideal employee. That employee is likely gendered
and raced in the sense that the employee has a preferred gender and
certain racial characteristics that are deemed desirable.179 For ease of
analysis, assume that the employee is White and male (though that will not
always be the case)."o Importantly, it is the plaintiff's distance from this
idealized norm that leads to discrimination.
The critical mistake in intra-group cases is a failure to realize that
employees fall on a spectrum of acceptability with employers making
nuanced and subtle distinctions at various points along the way. This may
be graphically depicted as follows with one representing the ideal
employee and each subsequent number representing some deviation from
that ideal:
I I I III I II I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
W W W W W W B B B B
Lighter- Darker-
toned toned
Black Black
W = White
B = Black
Importantly, some points along the continuum are more sharply
defined than others (e.g., point seven where a racial line is crossed). This
should not, however, obscure that critical distinctions are made elsewhere
on the spectrum. If one compares points that are close on the spectrum
(like the distance between seven and ten), then these distinctions will
appear minimal, almost trivial. Yet, if one takes a broader view, and
too ethnic looking or sounding, or too different, then the critical question becomes different
from what, or more precisely, from whom?
179. Depending upon context, the ideal employee may also have a preferred religion
and national origin, among other things.
180. For example, in a case where a defendant prefers a darker-toned Black to a
lighter-toned Black person, the ideal employee may be the person who is the antithesis of a
White male. This would also be true in an identity performance case where the defendant
prefers Shymeka to L.K. because L.K. does not act "black enough." See, e.g., Bryant v.
Begin Manage Program, 281 F. Supp. 2d 561, 574 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (refusing to grant
summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff alleged that her Black supervisor
discriminated because of plaintiffs lighter skin tone and because she failed to be
sufficiently Afrocentric).
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compares the distance between one and ten, then the deviation from the
norm is greater and the distinction being made is more readily seen.
To be sure, an employer will argue that the correct comparison is
between seven and ten. That is, if seven is acceptable, then there is no
reason why ten would not be similarly acceptable given the small
difference between them. Or, the assumption may be that the race line is
so significant that once employers cross it (e.g., by hiring at least one
person of color), they cannot possibly be discriminatory. Indeed, this is in
essence the standard argument offered in intra-group cases (i.e., there is no
meaningful difference in terms of desirability between two Black
employees and therefore an employer would not discriminate between
them). Again, this argument only has traction if one takes a narrow view
of the employee pool.'' But if one views the pool through a wider lens,
one sees that both seven and eight are so far removed from the ideal that
both are in a precarious position. And the farther an employee or
applicant is from one, the more likely she is to be rejected. The situation
may be analogized to a Law School Admissions officer's assessment of
LSAT scores. If the perfect score is 180, the officer may admit persons
who score between 160 and 180, but may determine that anything below a
160 is simply unacceptable. Thus, people with a 159 will be rejected
notwithstanding the marginal difference between a 159 and a 160. If the
baseline is 180, a 159 may be just one step too far removed from it.
One can apply this analysis to the hypotheticals with which I began
this Article. Recall the law firm associates L.K. and Shymeka. The
tendency in intra-group cases is to minimize what happens to Shymeka by
comparing her to L.K. and by arguing that the employer exhibited no
racial animus if it promoted a person of color to partner. But L.K. and
Shymeka are not the critical comparison. Rather one needs to determine
the characteristics of the ideal soon-to-be-partner associate in the
employer's workforce and measure Shymeka against this norm. If the
ideal associate is a White male who plays golf, wears suits, lives in the
suburbs, and is perfectly content with the status quo, then (though the
distance between L.K. and Shymeka may seem small) the distance
between Shymeka and this person will be vast. The same holds with the
Burch case. Burch was fired because he was too dark. If he is compared
with another Black employee, then that seems to be a marginal difference.
If an employer is willing to cross the racial line, then the argument goes, it
is less likely to discriminate over a "little thing" like skin shade. Yet, if one
takes the broader view, then one will see that there are various valuations
of brown. White is preferred. Lighter brown is okay. But, at some point,
181. Limiting the comparison to persons within a particular racial category artificially
minimizes the significance of an employer's actions.
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being too dark is simply too much.18
Importantly, this proposal does more than just widen the lens; it shifts
the framework of analysis. It does not ask how an employer has treated
someone outside of the plaintiff's class vis-A-vis the plaintiff (the question
that is typically posed under traditional cross-group analysis). Rather, this
new approach asks how the employer defines the ideal employee and
whether the factors upon which this determination rests are raced or
gendered, and if so, then to what extent should the law prevent their
use?183
I am not oblivious to the fact that identifying the ideal employee
presents a considerable challenge," especially given that what is ideal
varies across time and place. Nor am I so naive as to believe that the
above proposal will solve all of the proof problems in intra-group cases.
But rethinking conventional understandings of discrimination is a step in
the right direction. This reassessment requires reexamination of the idea
of discreet and clear cut categories upon which anti-discrimination law was
built and subsequently developed. This approach made sense when lines
between groups were sharper, when groups were treated as monoliths, and
when discrimination was largely a matter of the total exclusion or
marginalization of one group vis-a-vis another group. But times have
changed. As discrimination has become more sophisticated, subtle, and
nuanced, so too must conceptual frameworks lest the promise of anti-
discrimination law be rendered more illusory than real.
182. This, of course, brings to mind the familiar adage from the 1950s, "if you're white
you're all right; if you're brown, stick around; if you're black, stand back." Interview with
Hattie Jones (Mar. 2, 2000 and Mar. 22, 2000); Interview with Loris Ray (Mar. 2, 2000).
183. As in all discrimination cases, the question is not merely whether a person of
color is treated differently from a White employee. Although differential treatment may
raise an inference of discrimination, employers are given an opportunity to offer a
nondiscriminatory justification for their actions (e.g., the plaintiff was not qualified or was
not the most qualified person for the job). An additional hurdle arises in identity
performance cases because the question is not whether there is a neutral justification for
the employer's action (e.g., a desire to have all employees dress alike), but rather whether
the law ought to protect performances that are race or gender related. In addition, in
identity performance cases there is often no cross-group comparison. Thus, with the rap-
music loving employee, see supra note 163, the question is not merely whether the Black
employee is treated differently from the employer's ideal employee, but whether playing
rap music loudly is something the law should allow. Or, in a case involving a woman who
shuns makeup, the question is not simply whether she is treated differently from men, but
whether anti-discrimination law should prohibit rules requiring the wearing of makeup.
184. This obstacle, however, is not insurmountable. It can be met, in part, by
examining the characteristics of those persons who are most frequently hired or who are
most highly rewarded and successful in a particular workplace or setting.
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